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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three papers on the effect of homeownership on labor market 
outcomes. In the first paper, I developed a one-sector two-region endogenous job search model 
and show that when jobs arrive from both local labor market and non-local labor market, 
homeowners: are less likely to be unemployed than renters; and  have higher overall search 
intensity and exit rate than renters. I then estimate the effect of homeownership on 
unemployment using a panel data set aggregated from the American Community Survey data 
from 2003 to 2011 and use relative cost of owning a home as instrument for homeownership. I 
also estimate models at the individual level. Regression results show that homeownership is 
negatively and significantly related to unemployment confirming the theoretical predictions. 
These results are robust to different estimation methods and specifications.  
 The second paper evaluates the effect of homeownership on unemployment spell using 
the March Current Population Survey (CPS) data 1990 to 2013.  Using duration models, I find 
that when transition from unemployment to different types of employment (full time and part-
time) is ignored, homeownership decreases the probability of exiting unemployment. However, 
when the transition to different types of employment is considered, homeowners compared to 
renters have a lower probability of exit into full-time employment but have a higher probability 
of exit into part-time employment. Results from competing risk models when the transition into 
full-time and part-time employments are modeled simultaneously also exhibit similar patterns.  
 iii 
 
The final paper investigates job search intensity by unemployed homeowners and renters 
in the US using the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) data from 2003 to 2013. I use Ordinary 
Least Squares and two-limit Tobit methods to estimate my models. The findings from regression 
results across different specifications of the two models estimated using the full sample shows 
that, on average, homeowners search for jobs less intensively compared to renters. However, 
when the sample is disaggregated into different unemployed groups, I find that while job losers 
and temporary layoff homeowners search for jobs more intensively than renters, homeowners 
who are re-entrant and job leavers search for jobs less intensively than renters 
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INTRODUCTION 
In response to the housing market collapse, which has been largely blamed for the Great 
Recession (Abowd and Lars, 2012; Farber, 2012), researchers have begun to reexamine the link 
between housing policy and macroeconomic indicators, such as unemployment (Head and 
Lloyd-Ellis, 2012; Coulson and Fisher, 2002; Munch, Rosholm, and Svarer, 2008; Dohmen, 
2005). To formally examine this link, researchers have used job search frameworks where 
homeowners are assumed to be immobile due to higher transaction costs they face in moving, in 
response to labor market shocks. Catte et al. (2004) find that these transaction costs for sales of 
medium-sized houses in the US are around 9% of the sales price. These job search models 
generally predict that homeowners are more likely to be unemployed than renters. While 
theoretically tractable, empirical evidence has been largely inconsistent with the theoretical 
findings (see Oswald, 1999; Green and Hendershott, 2001; Flatau, Forbes, and Hendershott, 
2003).  
The main explanation for the mixed empirical results is that both homeownership and 
unemployment are endogenous. Most individuals purchase homes only when they are gainfully 
employed, while homeownership increases the chance of an unemployed homeowner 
participating in the labor market because it requires mortgage payments. Ignoring this reverse 
causality would lead to identification problems, causing biased and inconsistent estimates. 
Following Green and White (1997) and Haurin et al. (2002), I use relative cost of owning a 
home as an instrument for homeownership in my empirical estimations. The relative cost is 
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calculated by dividing Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) median contract rent by median 
owner cost of owner-occupied homes. Individuals are assumed to compare the cost of renting 
versus owning and factor in the benefits associated with owning. Thus, a high relative cost 
encourages homeownership since renting has become more expensive than owning a home.  
In this study, I derive an endogenous job search model that accounts for homeownership, 
and empirically test the prediction from the model. The main contribution of this paper is that 
unlike in Munch et al. (2006), I allow for job search intensity and market specific job search 
effectiveness. I find that, not only does a homeowner reduces her reservation wage in the local 
labor market to increase her job arrival rate as in Munch et al. (2006), but also a homeowner 
increases her job search intensity in the local labor market to increase her job arrival rate. As a 
result, the overall exit rate from unemployment is higher for a homeowner than a renter. This 
suggests a negative relationship between homeownership and unemployment.  
I test the theoretical prediction that homeownership is negatively related to 
unemployment using the American Community Survey data, which has never been used to study 
this relationship. I aggregate the data at Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level and use 
instrumental variable fixed-effect estimation methods to address the endogeneity problem 
inherent in most previous studies (Partridge and Rickman, 1997; Pehkonen, 1999; Coulson and 
Fisher, 2002).  In addition to the relative cost of owning a home, I use state mortgage deduction 
rates as instrument for homeownership when estimating at the individual level as in Coulson and 
Fisher (2009). Homeowners are provided with special state income tax treatment. The tax 
treatment for a homeowner includes deductions for property tax and mortgage interest. These 
deductions reduce the homeowner’s state income tax payment and, therefore, reduce the cost of 
homeownership. Hence, an increase in the state mortgage deduction encourages an individual to 
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own a home.  The results from both aggregate and individual level data across models show that 
homeownership is negatively and significantly related to unemployment, confirming the 
theoretical prediction. No empirical evidence is found in this study to support the claim that an 
increase in homeownership leads to an increase in unemployment.  
The rest of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review. 
Section 3 lay out the theoretical model. Section 4 describes and evaluates the data. Section 5 
presents the methodology. Section 6 provides empirical evidence for the theoretical prediction. 
Section 7 concludes the study. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Homeownership has several benefits to the individual homeowner and positive 
externalities to the community in which the individual homeowner lives. For instance, a home 
serves as an asset to the homeowner. Individual homeowners are also able to access credit easier 
since the home can serve as collateral.  According to Carasso et al. (2005), homeownership is 
cheaper than renting for long-tenured dwellers. They note that even for some lower-income 
households, the tax gains from owning can more than offset the cost of selling their homes if 
they have to move. Also, homeowners are more able to contribute to the stability of their 
community (Rohe, Van Zandt , and McCarthy, 2001; Aaronson, 2000; Rossi and Weber, 1996).  
Boehm and Schlottmann (1999) find that an average child of a homeowner achieves a higher 
level of education compared to a renter. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) also find that 
homeownership encourages investment in local and social capital. 
In spite of the benefits that come with owning a home, some studies find homeownership 
can impose negative externalities on the labor market. The negative externalities are a result of 
homeownership making homeowners less mobile through higher transaction costs of moving to 
different locations. This makes it difficult for homeowners to accept jobs that are far away from 
their homes. For example, Munch et al. (2008) observe that homeownership reduces the 
probability of job-to-job mobility in terms of transition into new jobs outside local labor markets. 
Battu et al. (2008) also find homeowners have a lower probability of gaining employment in 
more distant labor markets. 
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In a series of papers, Oswald (1996; 1997) shows that homeownership is positively 
correlated with unemployment. Oswald concludes that this positive correlation is due to 
immobility of homeowners. In a later paper, Oswald (1999) finds a positive causal relationship 
between homeownership and unemployment using an OLS regression. These findings of Oswald 
(1996; 1997; 1999) generated a new theoretical and empirical interest in the nature of the link 
between homeownership and unemployment. The theories which have been advanced to explain 
this relationship are mostly job search models in which homeowners are included either 
explicitly or implicitly. For instance, Coulson and Fisher (2002) use a labor market friction 
model with endogenous job creation and wages to show that higher homeownership reduces 
unemployment rates.  
Using a transaction friction model of the housing market and tenure decisions of 
households, Head and Lloyd-Ellis (2012) find homeownership and unemployment to be 
positively related. On the contrary, Munch et al. (2006) find that homeownership improves the 
chances of finding job in a two region one-sided job search model.  
The empirical studies mostly treat homeowners and renters as control and treatment 
groups. For instance, van Vuuren (2009) divides individuals into homeowners and renters in his 
study. These studies often tend to estimate the probability of a homeowner being unemployed 
relative to a renter instead of a linear relationship. Other studies, such as Green and Hendershott 
(2001) divide homeowners into age groups. In Green and Hendershott (2001) no relationship is 
found to exist between homeownership and unemployment for young and old household, but 
only for middle-aged households. After weighting observations, they find Oswald’s correlation 
to disappear. Munch et al. (2006) find that homeownership affects relocation for job but 
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increases the likelihood of being employed locally. They arrived at this conclusion by dividing 
employment into local and non-local employment.  
There are other studies that examined this relationship. These studies include Pehkonen 
(1999) who finds support for the Oswald’s results and shows that a 10% higher unemployment 
rate for homeowners than renters. Laamanen (2013) finds that while homeowners are less likely 
to experience unemployment, an increase in the rate of homeownership causes regional 
unemployment to rise. Laamanen suggests that spillover effects may explain the conflicting 
results in the literature. Lerbs (2011) finds a negative relationship between homeownership and 
unemployment. However, when regional heterogeneity is accounted for, this relationship 
becomes positive, supporting the Oswald’s correlation. Lerbs explains that considering the 
limitations of his study, possible spatial dependence among regional labor markets should be 
studied. 
It has been observed that renters who change their homeownership status may be under 
financial pressure because of their mortgage payment. This results in a change in their labor 
market behavior. For instance, Havet and Penot (2010) show that homeownership, through the 
financial constraint it causes, increases female labor supply. In this case, Oswald’s correlation 
could remain valid while the number of people having a job would be higher. Hence, linking 
homeownership and lower labor market performances would be misleading. Goss and Phillips 
(1997) also conclude that homeownership significantly reduces job search. According to them, 
this happens through two mechanisms. Because homeownership requires monthly mortgage 
payments and income, homeowners end the job search process sooner and take any available job. 
On the other hand, home equity eases the search process by providing wealth that renters may 
not possess.  
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Since several puzzling results have been obtained from trying to find the nature of the 
relationship between homeownership and unemployment, studies have used different estimation 
methods to address estimation concerns attributed to previous studies. According to Dietz and 
Haurin (2003), nearly all pre-1990 empirical studies are subject to the criticism of not taking 
endogeneity into account and thus their results are suspect. To avoid this criticism, Green and 
Hendershott (2001) use weighted regression on the entire states based on age classes with 
population size as weights and controlled for endogeneity by introducing inverse Mill ratios for 
each type of tenure decisions. van Vuuren (2009) uses a reduced form model and a mixed 
proportional hazard specification. Munch et al. (2006) use non-parametric hazard function 
(Kaplan-Meier estimates) and competing-risks mixed proportional hazard model.  
I address econometric concerns attributed to previous studies. I use the relative cost of 
owning a home as an instrument to estimate the effect of homeownership on unemployment. 
Also, I address selection problems by using fixed effect estimation methods. I control for other 
important variables missing in previous studies and use estimation techniques that are robust to 
endogeneity problems. 
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THEORETICAL MODEL 
I present a two-region one-sided endogenous job search model similar to Munch et al. 
(2006). My model differs from Munch et al. (2006) by allowing 1.  market specific job search 
effectiveness; 2.  endogenous search intensity; 2 .a  job search cost as function of search intensity; 
and 2 .b  potential job arrival rate to be proportional to search intensity. The introduction of these 
variables provides new theoretical insights into the relationship between homeownership and 
unemployment.  
Let time periods be denoted by t  and each of length .t  Assume that individuals have 
infinite lifetimes. There is a continuum of individuals of mass one, each having a utility function 
given by 0
0
t
t
t
E c


 where 0 1   and 
1
1 r
 

 with r as the discount rate.  An individual 
must live in her local labor market ( )l  at a point in time but can move to a non-local labor 
market ( ).n  Let h  equal 1 if an individual is a homeowner and 0 if an individual is a renter. 
There are many different jobs in this economy, which differ according to wage .w  The wage 
offers that the unemployed can receive has a CDF and PDF denoted as ( )F w  and ( ),f w  
respectively with [ , ].w W W   
If an individual is unemployed, she receives an unemployment benefit z  from the 
government at the beginning of the period .t  There are no saving opportunities. So consumption 
in any period equals z  or .w  An individual starts as unemployed and first receives .z  In the next 
period, she then receives job offers at the rate of ls  in the local labor market and ns  in the 
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non-local labor market where s  represents search effort and   represents potential job offer 
arrival rate. Job search entails some per period cost that varies with search effort. This cost 
function is additively separable, that is      , .l n l nc s s c s c s   Increasing marginal cost of 
search effort requires that the cost function has the properties (0) 0,c  ( ) 0c    and ( ) 0.c    
Assume some jobs have higher compensation than the unemployment benefit so that 
 .z W  There is some endogenous reservation wage R  that the offer must exceed if an 
individual is to accept it. An individual must choose either to accept the job offer or continue 
searching for another period. If an offer is rejected, the individual continues to search for another 
period. Once an offer is accepted, an individual keeps her job until she is separated at the rate of 
, known as the job separation rate. If separated, an individual enters the pool of unemployed 
and must start searching again. While unemployed, an individual can exit from unemployment at 
the rate .  
Let   be the effectiveness of search effort to receive an offer in the local labor market. 
To work in the non-local labor market, an individual must move from her current local labor 
market. For homeowners, this means selling their homes. Also, let k  be an unemployed 
homeowner’s transaction cost of moving from a local labor market to a non-local labor market to 
accept a job offer.  
The present discounted value of the expected income stream of an unemployed and 
employed homeowner at the wage w  are denoted by uV  and eV , respectively. These values are 
to be determined by two Bellman equations. An employed homeowner receives wage w , utility 
from owning a home ( ),u h  and then either suffers an exogenous job separation or continue to 
work at the wage w  next period. So her eV is given by equation (1).  
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            , , , 1- , ,e u eV w h t w t t u h t tV h t t t V w h t t               (1) 
    
It is important to note that the employed homeowner will opt to remain employed if she does not 
suffer an exogenous job separation, because ,e uV V  otherwise she would not have accepted the 
job in the first place. Taking limit of equation (1)  and assuming steady state, I derive equation 
(2).  
 
 
 
   
1
,e uV w h w u h V h
r


    
 (2) 
                                                                            
Equation (2)  helps to determine what wage offers an unemployed homeowner will 
accept when unemployed. From equation (2),  the value of being employed is a strictly 
increasing linear function of the wage ,w  that is 
( , )
0.e
V w h
w



 Since ( , 1) ( , 0)e eV w h V w h   , 
an individual increases her present discounted value of the expected income stream by becoming 
a homeowner.  
The value of unemployment for the unemployed homeowner equal the sum of 
unemployment benefit ;z  present discounted value of unemployment in the next period; utility 
from owning a home; and the expected value of finding a job in both the local and non-local 
labor markets minus the job search cost, that increases with search intensity. Hence, uV  satisfies  
             
      
        
, , , , 1 1 ,
max , , , ,
1 max , , , ,
u l n l n u
w
l e u
w
w
n e u
w
V h t z t t c s s h t t u h t s s V h t t
s t V w h t t V h t t f w dw
s t V w h t t hk V h t t f w dw
    
  
 
           

     


        



 
(3) 
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Taking limit of equation (3)  and assuming steady state, I derive equation (4).  Equation (4)  
states that an unemployed homeowner receives unemployment benefit z as long as she stays 
unemployed plus some utility from owning a home less the job search cost, that is  
 
            
        
, , max , ,0
1 max , ,0
w
u l n l e u
w
w
n e u
w
rV h z c s s h u h s V w h V h f w dw
s V w h V h hk f w dw
 
 
    
   


 (4) 
 
With probabilities 
ls   and (1 ),ns  the unemployed homeowner meets a firm in the 
local and non-local labor markets, respectively, and is offered a wage from the wage distribution 
( ).F w  Given the offered wage the unemployed worker has to decide whether or not to accept the 
job at the offered wage.  For the unemployed renter, urV  is given by 
 
              , 1 max , ,0u l n l n e u
w
rV h z c s s u h s s V w h V h f w dw
w
              (5) 
 
Since eV is an increasing function of ,w  there is some 
h
lR  in the local labor market for the 
homeowner such that    , ,e l u lV w h V w h  for 
h
l lw R  and    , ,e l u lV w h V w h  for
h
l lw R . 
The reservation wage hlR  makes the homeowner indifferent between staying unemployed and 
becoming employed. Hence, hlR  satisfies    ,he l uV R h V h . From equation (2),  I derive 
equation (6).  
 
   
1 h
u lV h R u h
r
     (6) 
  
   13 
 
Similarly, in the non-local labor market for the homeowner, there is some h
nR  such that 
   , ,e n u nV w h hk V w h   for 
h
n nw R  and    , ,e n u nV w h hk V w h   for 
h
n nw R . Hence, 
h
nR  
satisfies    ,e n uV w h hk V h  . From equation (2), I obtain equation (7).   
 
     
1 h
u nV h R u h r hk
r
       (7) 
 
Using equations (2)  and (6),  the gain from finding a job    ,e uV w h V h  is given by equation 
(8). Equation (8) shows that gains from employment only occur, if the wage w  is above the 
reservation wage h
lR  for the homeowner in the local labor market. 
 
   ,
h
l
e u
w R
V w h V h
r 

 

 (8) 
  
Combining equations (4) , (6)  and (8),  I derive the expression for the reservation wage for the 
homeowner in the local labor market as 
 
   
 
 n
1
, 1 1
h h
l n
w w
h l
l l n
R R
ss
R z c s s F w dw F w dw
r r
  
 

             
 (9) 
 
Equations (6)  and (7)  implies ( ) .
h h
n lR R r hk    Using this expression and equation 
(9),  the expression for the reservation wage for the homeowner in the non-local labor market 
becomes 
 
     
 
 n
1
, 1 1
h h
l n
w w
h l
n l n
R R
ss
R z c s s r hk F w dw F w dw
r r
  

 

               
 (10) 
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Noting that an unemployed renter does not own a home so that 0,h   plugging 0h   into 
equation (6)  and combining the resulting equation with equation (5),  I derive the expression for 
the reservation wage for the renter in both the local and non-local labor markets as 
 
 
 
 *
1
, 1
w
l n
l n
R
s s
R z c s s F w dw
r
   

         
 (11) 
 
Proposition 1.  * * *
l nR R R   and 
* * *.l ns s s    
The renter has the same reservation wage in both the local and non-local labor markets 
because she does not have to sell any home to move to a non-local labor market, hence 0hk   
since 0.h   Similarly, the job search intensity for the renter is the same in both the local and 
non-local labor markets. This is due to the fact that as 0hk   the effectiveness and cost of job 
search efforts are the same for the renter in both markets. Proof: see appendix A.1.  
Proposition 2. * .h hl nR R R   
The reservation wage for the unemployed homeowner in the non-local labor market is 
higher than the reservation wage in the local labor market, i.e. .h hn lR R  Also, in the non-local 
labor market, the reservation wage for the unemployed homeowner is higher than the reservation 
wage for the renter, i.e. *hnR R  but lower than the reservation wage for the renter in the local 
labor market, i.e. *.hlR R ,
h h
n lR R  
*,hlR R  and 
*h
nR R  imply that 
* .h hl nR R R   A 
homeowner is likely to become unemployed in the non-local labor market because of her higher 
reservation wage. However, because a homeowner decreases her reservation wage in the local 
labor market to avoid moving to the non-local labor market to accept a job, her lower reservation 
wage increases her job arrival rate in the local labor market. Proof: see appendix A.2. 
Proposition 3. * * *l ns s s   and 
* * *2 .l ns s s   
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The homeowner searches for a job more intensively in the local labor market than in the 
non-local labor market, i.e. * *.l ns s  Also, the homeowner searches for a job more intensively 
than the renter in the local labor market, i.e. * *
ls s  but less intensively than the renter in the 
non-local labor market, * *.ns s  
* *,l ns s  
* *,ls s  and 
* *
ns s  imply that 
* * *.l ns s s   A 
homeowner increases her job arrival rate in the local labor market by increasing her job search 
intensity. This is because the homeowner prefers a job in the local labor market to a job in the 
non-local labor market. Also, the overall job search intensity for the homeowner in both the local 
and non-local labor market is higher than the overall job search intensity for the renter, i.e. 
* * *2 .l ns s s   As k  increases, the homeowner increases her search intensity in the local labor 
market than in the non-local labor market so that, for a small increase in ,k  the difference in the 
local search intensity between the homeowner and renter is greater that the difference in the non-
local search intensity. Hence, the homeowner has higher overall search intensity than the renter. 
Proof: see appendix A.3.  
Proposition 4. 
*
l n     and 
*2 .l n      
From * * *l ns s s   and 
*h h
l nR R R   it can be concluded that 
* .l n     This means 
that the exit rate from unemployment for the homeowner is higher than the exit rate for the renter 
in the local labor market but less than the exit rate from unemployment for the renter in the non-
labor market. The overall exit rate from unemployment for the homeowner in both the local non-
local labor market is greater than the overall exit rate from unemployment for the renter, i.e.  
*2 .l n     Proof: see appendix A.4. 
It can be concluded from the theoretical model that when homeowners incur transaction 
costs for moving to non-local labor markets to accept jobs, they would decrease their reservation 
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wages and increase their job search intensities in order to increase their job arrival rates in the 
local labor market. This is because homeowners prefer local labor markets to non-local labor 
markets. The overall effect is that homeowners are able to exit from unemployment faster than 
renters. This suggests that higher homeownership would lead to lower unemployment rate.  
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DATA 
The main data set for this study is the American Community Survey (ACS). The ACS 
data set is obtained through the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA) database. 
Additional variables, which are not readily available in the IPUMS-USA database, are obtained 
from other sources. I obtain union members as a percentage of total individuals employed by 
state from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and state mortgage deduction rates from the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).   
In extracting the data set from the IPUMS-USA database, I exclude observations for 
individuals younger than 18 years and individuals older than 65 years of age. This range is 
chosen because the age of 18 is considered adulthood while the age of 65 is the official 
retirement age in the USA. Observations with group quarters status are also excluded. Group 
quarters status reports people who live in a group.
1
  
Since my analysis is focused on the unemployed, I also remove observations for those 
who are not in the labor force (e.g. discouraged workers, Armed forces, those unable to work, 
those attending school and housework). Further, I remove those who are self-employed from the 
data set because of my interest in those who work for wages and salary.   
The aggregate variables that I use are computed from the individual level ACS data. The 
percentage of homeowners in an MSA is computed by first creating a variable for only those 
who own homes. I obtain total homeowners by summing at the MSA level. Percentages are then 
                                                 
1
 Group quarters are largely institutions (e.g., mental institutions, correctional facilities, institutions for the elderly, 
handicapped and the poor) and other group living arrangements (e.g., rooming houses, boarding schools, college 
dormitories and military barracks). 
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calculated by dividing total homeowners in an MSA by the total population in an MSA and 
multiplied by 100. This process is repeated for percentages of the unemployed, immigrants, 
blacks, Hispanics, age categories and education categories.
2
 
The individual level variables are potentially skewed. As a result, the averages of these 
variables would be biased and may not be representative. The median therefore may be more 
representative. Hence, I compute the median values of wage and salary income, contract rent and 
user cost of owning a home instead of their means.  
Figure 1 shows the scatter plot and fitted regression line of unemployment and 
homeownership using the aggregated data. The Figure plots unemployment rate against the 
homeownership rate in MSAs. We see that the fitted regression line shows a negative 
relationship between unemployment and homeownership. 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the ACS aggregate data. The Table shows 
average percentage of homeownership to be 67.63% over the sample period. The average 
unemployment rate over the sample period is 7.31%. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for 
the individual level ACS data. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 All the aggregate variables computed are weighted by the person weights provided in the American Community 
Survey data. The person weight indicates how many persons in the US population that are represented by a given 
person in the IPUMS sample. 
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ECONOMETRIC MODEL SPECIFICATION 
I estimate several models of the following form at the MSA level using the ACS aggregated data 
described in the previous section from 2005 to 2011: 
 
0 1 1 1 2 1 3 2    X it it it it it it i t itU U H H H                    (122) 
 
where i indexes MSAs and t  indexes time of survey year. The variable U is the percentage of 
the unemployed. The variable H is the percentage of homeowners and X is a vector of time 
varying control variables including income, population growth, percentages of union members, 
Blacks, Hispanics, age categories, education categories, divorced, separated, married, widowed 
and immigrants. The variable i  is MSA fixed effect that captures variables that are constant 
over time but vary across MSAs. The variable t  is year fixed effect that accounts for 
nationwide shocks to unemployment. The variable it  is time-varying error and represents 
unobserved factors that change over time and affect .U  Blanchflower and Oswald (2013) find 
the unemployment rate to be higher in states with high homeownership rates in the past. As a 
result, I include lag values in equation (12).  
First, I estimate equation (12) with standard fixed and random effects models without lag 
values of unemployment and homeownership. Then I estimate fixed effects two stage least-
squares (FETSLS) and the instrumental variable regression method proposed by Lewbel (2012). 
Finally, I estimate equation (12) in its dynamic form using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel 
estimator. 
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I used the Hausman test to compare the random and the fixed effects models under the 
hypothesis that individual effects are random and the estimators are similar because both are 
consistent. The test statistics is highly statistically significant and rejects the random effects 
model. However, the fixed effects model assumes homeownership is exogenous in equation (12). 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that homeownership is exogenous and 
is endogenous in equation (12). This means that instrumental variables technique is required to 
consistently estimate the coefficient of homeownership. 
I estimate equation (12) using FETSLS estimator to control for endogeneity.  
Homeownership expenditure is jointly determined with employment decisions in equilibrium. 
Most individuals purchase homes only when they are gainfully employed, while homeownership 
increases the chance of an unemployed homeowner participating in the labor market because it 
requires mortgage payments. Hence, both homeownership and unemployment are 
simultaneously determined, making both variables endogenous.  
Following Green and White (1997) and Haurin et al. (2002), I use relative cost of owning 
a home as an instrument for homeownership. The relative cost is calculated by dividing median 
contract rent by median owner cost of owner-occupied homes. An important consideration when 
analyzing the demand for homeownership investment is the cost of renting. Buying a home 
includes the purchase price with down payment and interest payments over many years. Other 
costs associated with owning include maintenance, insurance and property taxes. These expenses 
would not have to be paid if renting is chosen.  
As a result, individuals are assumed to compare all cash flows that will be associated with 
each form of occupancy, and then calculate the rate of return that will be earned on the funds 
used to make an equity investment (down payment) if the property is purchased. Therefore, an 
   21 
 
individual compare the cost of renting versus owning and factors in the benefits associated with 
owning. This cost known as the relative cost of owning a home informs the individual’s decision 
to own a home. A high relative cost means that renting is more expensive relative to owning. 
This leads to an increase in homeownership relative to renting. Hence, homeownership and 
relative cost of owning a home are positively related.  
According to Garcia and Hernandez (2004), we can also view the relative cost in terms of 
expectation formation where individuals compare past values and predict the trend in the relative 
cost. Consequently, if households expect the relative cost to increase in the future for a long 
time, then they are more likely to own a home. Harkness and Newman (2003) note that higher 
property values relative to rent should reduce the attractiveness of owning a home.  
In order for relative cost to be a valid instrument, it must be uncorrelated with the error 
term in equation (12) and partially correlated with homeownership. To check the latter 
requirement, homeownership is regressed on relative cost and all of the exogenous variables 
appearing in equation (12). Since the t statistics on relative cost is statistically significant and 
relative cost is uncorrelated with unobserved factors in the error term, it can be used as an 
instrument for homeownership. 
I also use the instrumental variable method suggested by Lewbel (2012). This method 
allows the identification of structural parameters in regression models with endogenous or 
mismeasured regressors in the absence of traditional identifying information such as external 
instruments or repeated measurements. Identification is achieved in this context by having 
regressors that are uncorrelated with the product of heteroscedastic errors, which is a feature of 
many models where error correlations are due to an unobserved common factor.
3
  The greater the 
                                                 
3
 Identification is obtained by restricting correlations of  with X. Restricting correlations of    with X does not 
automatically provide identification. The structural model parameters remain unidentified under the standard 
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degree of scale heteroskedasticity in the error process, the higher will be the correlation of the 
generated instruments with the included endogenous variables which are the regressands in the 
first stage regressions. 
The fixed effect within estimator discussed above yields inconsistent estimate when 
equation (12) is estimated with the lag values. Also, the FETSLS method is not possible because 
any lag of U will be correlated with 
i  and it i  . Also, with the presence of lag values in 
equation (12) mean-differencing cannot eliminate the fixed effects but rather first-differencing. 
As a result consistent estimates can be obtained by instrumental variable estimation in the first-
difference model using appropriate lags as instruments. As a result, the Arellano and Bond 
estimator provides consistent estimates of equation (12) with the lags value in it. 
The Arellano and Bond estimator is designed for dynamic small time series and large 
cross-section panels that may contain fixed effects and separate from those fixed effects are 
idiosyncratic errors that may be heteroskedastic and correlated within but not across individuals. 
So for consistent estimation, this estimator requires that idiosyncratic errors be serially 
uncorrelated. The estimator is also designed for linear functional relationship; a dependent 
variable that is dynamic, depending on its own past realizations; explanatory variables that are 
not strictly exogenous: correlated with past and possibly current realizations of the error; and 
fixed individual effects which imply unobserved heterogeneity. 
                                                                                                                                                             
homoscedasticity assumption that ( | )E X  is constant, and more generally are not identified when  and X are 
independent. However, parameters may be identified given some heteroskedasticity. In particular, identification is 
obtained by assuming that 
2
cov( , ) 0jX   for 2j  in a triangular system (or for both 1j  or 2j   in a fully 
simultaneous system) and assuming that cov( , ) 0
1 2
X    for an observed Z, where Z can be a subset of X. If 
1 2cov( , ) 0X    then set identification, specifically, bounds on parameters, can still be obtained as long as this 
covariance is not too large (Lewbel, 2012).   
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I also estimate models at the individual level. Wooldridge (2010, pages 594-599) notes 
that when a binary explanatory variable is endogenous and the correlation between the error 
terms of the structural and reduced form equations is not equal to zero, estimation of the 
structural equation with probit will lead to inconsistent estimates. Also, the two-step probit 
estimation, as used in Coulson and Fisher (2009), produces inconsistent estimates. Wooldridge 
suggests estimating a seemingly unrelated (SUR) bivariate probit model when a binary variable 
is endogenous.  
Following Wooldridge (2010), I address the endogeneity issue by estimating the bivariate 
probit model:  
 * *
0 1 1, 1 0, 0 otherwiseX i i i i iU H U if U         
 
* *
0 2, 1 0, 0 otherwiseZ X i i i i iH H if H        
 
(13) 
where  1 2
0 1
, | , , , .
0 1
Z XH N

 

    
     
    
 The variable U represents employment status 
which equal 1 if an individual is unemployed and 0 otherwise. Also, H represents 
homeownership status and equal to 1 if an individual is a homeowner and 0 otherwise. The 
variable X is a vector of control variables, including income, MSA population, union 
membership, age, education, marital status, race, gender, family size, immigration status and 
ability to speak English. The variable Z  is a vector of instruments for homeownership. In 
addition to the relative cost of owning a home, I add state mortgage deduction variable when 
estimating at the individual level as in Coulson and Fisher (2009). Homeowners are provided 
with special state income tax treatment. This treatment is not available to renters; therefore, cash 
flows for renters are the same on a before- and after-tax basis. The tax treatment for a 
homeowner includes deductions for property tax and mortgage interest. These deductions reduce 
   24 
 
the owner’s state income tax payment and, therefore, reduce the cost of homeownership. Hence, 
an increase in the state mortgage deduction encourages an individual to own a home.  
The bivariate probit model collapses to two separate probit models if the error correlation 
0,   which means that there is no endogeneity problem and the errors are independent. The 
two equations are estimated simultaneously using maximum likelihood method. To derive the 
likelihood function, we need to obtain the joint distribution of (U, H) conditional on Z and X 
given by      , | , | , , | ,f U H Z X f U H Z X f H Z X .  The log-likelihood function is derived 
by combining the four possible outcomes of (U, H) along with the probit model for H and taking 
logs (Wooldridge, 2010, pages 595). For purposes of comparison with the bivariate probit 
estimates, I also estimate other models such as probit and Linear Probability Model (LPM). 
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ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Estimation Results from Aggregated Data 
Table 3 reports the fixed-effects estimates of equation (12). The dependent variable is the 
MSA level unemployment rates from 2005 to 2011. The coefficient on homeownership is 
negative and statistically significant across all columns. However, the coefficient on 
homeownership becomes smaller with the addition of more controls. The inclusion of year fixed 
effects to account for nationwide shocks makes the coefficient in column (6) becomes much 
smaller than in column (5). These results are consistent with Coulson and Fisher (2002). 
However, the main problem with this study, as well as the regression results in Table 3, is that 
homeownership is endogenous.  
I use the FETSLS estimator to address the endogeneity problem. The first stage estimates 
for homeownership rates in MSAs are reported in Table 4. Relative cost has the expected sign. 
The coefficient is positive and statistically significant across all the columns. This indicates that 
as relative cost of owning a home increases, homeownership rates will increase in MSAs. As 
Table 4 shows, the F-statistics for the first stage regressions from columns (1) – (6) range from a 
high of 140 to a low of 28. This gives some confidence that the instrument will not suffer from 
weak instrument bias.  
Table 5 presents the second stage estimates for the FETSLS estimator with standard 
errors clustered at the MSA level. The dependent variable in each column is the MSA 
unemployment rates between 2005 and 2011. After accounting for the endogeneity of 
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homeownership by using the relative cost of owning a home as instrument, homeownership now 
has larger effects on unemployment than obtained from the fixed effects estimates without the 
instrument in Table 3.  
I also implement the instrumental variable regression estimation method proposed by 
Lewbel (2012). Table 6 presents the results. The effect of homeownership on unemployment 
remains negative and statistically significant. However, the Lewbel estimation method has 
coefficients on homeownership comparatively larger than the fixed effects model but smaller 
than the FETSLS. 
The Arellano and Bond dynamic panel model is also estimated to take advantage of the 
time-series properties of the panel in further addressing the endogeneity problem. The time-
series properties of the panel make it possible to use the lagged structure of the explanatory 
variables as instruments in addition to the relative cost of owning a home. Table 7 presents the 
estimation results for the Arellano and Bond estimator. Current and past values of 
homeownership have significant effects on unemployment in columns (1) – (6). The 
contemporaneous values of homeownership have negative and significant effects. The past 
values of homeownership have positive and significant effects on unemployment, as in 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2013). The coefficient on the contemporaneous value of 
homeownership for the Arellano and Bond estimates are larger than the fixed effects estimates. 
The Arellano and Bond estimates are however, comparatively close to FETSLS estimates. Figure 
2 plots the impulse response functions for the Arellano and Bond estimates. It appears that the 
initial impact of homeownership on unemployment is negative, but the effect soon becomes 
positive and then converges to zero as time passes. By the 4
th
 period the effect of homeownership 
on unemployment is virtually zero. 
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Table 9 presents the last columns of Tables (3) – (6) for ease of comparison. As we can 
see from the Table, all the coefficients on homeownership are negative and significant across 
different specifications and different estimators. These results are robust. Consequently, it can be 
concluded with some confidence that homeownership has a negative effect on unemployment as 
found by Coulson and Fisher (2009), Lerbs (2011) and Laamanen (2013), but contrary to Oswald 
(1996; 1997; 1999).   
Estimation Results from Individual Level Data 
Table 10 and 11 reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the bivariate probit using 
relative cost and state mortgage deduction as instruments. Table 10 presents estimates of the first 
stage homeownership equation. In columns (1) - (5) of Table 10, the coefficients on both relative 
cost and mortgage deduction are positive and statistically significant.  
Table 11 reports estimates for the unemployment equation. The estimate of the 
correlation coefficient is negative, statistically significant and the null hypothesis of 0  is 
rejected 5% significance level using a Wald test. The coefficients of the instruments have the 
expected signs and are also statistically significant. Therefore, the errors in both equations are 
correlated giving evidence of the endogeneity of homeownership. In column (1) the coefficient 
on homeownership is negative and significant. This means that homeownership reduces the 
probability of becoming unemployed. When labor market characteristics are included in the 
model, the coefficient on homeownership remains negative and statistically significant in column 
(2). Demographic characteristics are added in column (3). The coefficient on homeownership 
remains negative and statistically significant. In column (4), I use relative cost as the only 
instrument in the homeownership equation and homeownership remains negative and statistically 
significant. In column (5), mortgage deduction is the only instrument used in the homeownership 
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equation and the coefficient on homeownership still remains negative and statistically significant 
in the structural equation.  
Tables 12-14 present estimation results from three other approaches to compare with the 
bivariate probit model: bivariate probit that drops relative cost and mortgage deduction from the 
homeownership equation in Table 12, probit treating homeownership as exogenous in Table 13, 
and a linear probability model (LPM) in Table 14. The bivariate probit model without instrument 
is included to see if the nonlinearity in the model identifies the parameters. The coefficients 
across the models suggest a qualitatively similar story about the relationship between 
homeownership and unemployment. The signs of the coefficients on homeownership are the 
same across models and statistically significant, as are all the control variables in each model.  
Table 15 presents the coefficients and average partial effects (APE) of homeownership 
across models. When homeownership is assumed to be exogenous, the LPM and the probit 
models give smaller estimated average partial effects of being a homeowner relative to the 
bivariate probit with instruments. In column (3) where the estimate of bivariate probit treats 
homeownership as endogenous with relative cost and mortgage deduction used as instrumental 
variables in the homeownership equation, the APE of homeownership is -0.01124 which is larger 
than both the probit that treats homeownership as exogenous and the LPM APEs. 
When relative cost and mortgage deduction are dropped from homeownership equation 
of the bivariate probit model, which in the linear context, would lead to lack of identification, the 
estimate of the APE becomes larger and the estimated rho increases. This suggests that including 
relative cost and mortgage deduction in the homeownership equation helps reduce the correlation 
between unobservables that affect both unemployment and homeownership.  
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CONCLUSION 
In this study, I investigate the effect of homeownership on unemployment. I deviate from 
previous studies by using different estimation methods and data sets.  Using a theoretic 
endogenous job search model, I show that when jobs arrive from local and non-local markets, 
homeowners are less likely to be unemployed than renters. Results from the theoretical model 
are tested empirically using instrumental variable methods to address the endogeneity of 
homeownership. The regression results show that homeownership is negatively and significantly 
correlated with unemployment, confirming the theoretical prediction. This shows that an increase 
in homeownership will reduce unemployment. Hence, the study finds no evidence that suggests 
that homeownership weakens employment opportunities for homeowners or high 
homeownership in a geographical area causes employment problems. 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1: 
* * *
l nR R R   and 
* * *.l ns s s   
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The above equation is true when 
* * *.l ns s s   
This proves proposition 1. 
 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2: 
* .h hl nR R R   
From equations (6) and (7), we have 
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The proof that 
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n lR R  is identical. 
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*,hlR R  and 
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This proves proposition 2. 
 
A3: Proposition 3: 
* * *
l ns s s   and 
* * *2 .l ns s s   
To prove 
* *,l ns s  we take obtain the first order condition of the reservation wage for the homeowners in 
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To prove that 
* ,ls s we have to use implicit function theorem by taking the derivative of search intensity 
with respect to .k  
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This derivative is also equal to zero for 
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l ls s from the FOC. 
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As transaction cost increases the homeowner decreases her reservation wage in the local labor market 
since she prefers a job in the local labor market to a job in the non-local labor market. 
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As transaction cost increases the homeowner increases her search for job in the local labor market. Hence, 
when k  increases from zero to a positive number, there is an increase in search in the local labor market. 
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This means that for a very small ,k   the difference in the local search intensity between the 
homeowner and the renter is greater than the difference in the non-local search intensity. 
* *
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* * *2l ns s s    
This means that the overall search intensity is higher for the homeowner than the renter. 
This proves proposition 3.  
 
A.4 Proposition 4: 
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This proves proposition 4. 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 Aggregated American Community Survey (ACS) Data, 2005 – 2011 
Variables Observation Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Unemployment (%) 2079 8.07 2.95 1.41 26.62 
Homeownership (%) 2079 68.44 7.22 34.77 85.51 
Median Income (log) 2079 11.07 0.17 10.50 11.68 
Population growth 1782 1.02 3.85 -2.98 19.57 
Union members (%) 1442 11.91 7.38 0.00 55.90 
Black Population (%) 2079 11.54 10.59 0.12 56.42 
Hispanic Population (%) 2079 12.31 15.43 0.10 95.89 
Immigrant Population (%) 2079 9.44 7.99 0.37 52.45 
Age 18 – 24 (%) 2079 16.10 3.31 9.01 38.42 
Age 25 – 29 (%) 2079 11.63 1.71 5.99 21.26 
Age 30 – 34 (%) 2079 10.68 1.40 4.41 16.65 
Age 35 – 39 (%) 2079 11.13 1.44 5.95 18.23 
Age 40 – 44 (%) 2079 11.80 1.47 5.31 17.15 
Age 45 – 49 (%) 2079 12.30 1.32 7.11 17.63 
Age 50 – 54 (%) 2079 11.33 1.31 6.09 15.71 
Age 55 – 59 (%) 2079 8.94 1.34 4.65 17.34 
Age 60 – 65 (%) 2079 6.09 1.33 1.73 13.72 
Single (%) 2079 1.37 0.46 0.00 4.38 
Married (%) 2079 53.24 4.42 33.61 73.11 
Separated (%) 2079 2.44 0.98 0.16 8.11 
Divorced (%) 2079 11.98 2.21 5.25 20.15 
Widowed (%) 2079 1.37 0.46 0.01 4.38 
No Education (%) 2079 0.50 0.46 0.01 5.71 
< High School (%) 2079 9.51 3.81 2.81 29.49 
High School (%) 2079 36.15 6.36 14.83 55.64 
< College (%) 2079 26.14 3.83 13.71 42.14 
College (%) 2079 18.15 4.59 5.95 33.57 
Graduate Degree (%) 2079 9.54 3.77 1.93 25.29 
Female Population (%) 2079 47.27 1.90 41.42 58.47 
Cannot Speak English (%) 2079 1.15 1.85 0.00 15.85 
Relative Cost  2079 1.57 0.22 0.99 2.30 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics  
Individual Level American Community Survey (ACS) Data, 2005 – 2011 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Unemployment (= 1) 3825961 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Homeownership (= 1) 3825961 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Mortgage Deduction (% in State) 3813571 3.37 3.65 2.15 10.19 
Wage and Salary (Log) 3532059 10.53 0.98 1.39 13.41 
Union Membership (% in MSA) 3366834 12.70 6.72 0.00 55.90 
Population (Log) 3825961 13.05 1.33 9.82 15.27 
Age (Years) 3825961 43.90 11.46 18.00 65.00 
Family Size 3825961 2.61 1.50 1.00 20.00 
No School (= 1) 3825961 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00 
< High School (= 1) 3825961 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
High School (= 1) 3825961 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 
< College (= 1) 3825961 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
College (= 1) 3825961 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
> College 3825961 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Married (= 1) 3825961 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Black (= 1) 3825961 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Hispanic (= 1) 3825961 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Female (= 1) 3825961 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Immigrant (= 1) 3825961 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Speak English (= 1) 3825961 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
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Table 6 
Second Stage Estimates for the Lewbel (2012) Instrumental Variable Fixed Effects Estimator 
Aggregated American Community Survey (ACS) Data, 2005 to 2011 
Dependent Variables: Unemployment (%) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Homeownership (%) -1.1175
***
 -0.9765
***
 -0.4310
***
 -0.1488
**
 
 (0.0842) (0.1249) (0.0998) (0.0643) 
Median Income (Log) 0.7760 -0.7180 -6.4624
***
 -9.1234
***
 
 (1.6510) (1.6430) (1.3468) (1.1953) 
Population Growth -0.1285
***
 -0.1295
***
 -0.1177
***
 -0.0325
**
 
 (0.0196) (0.0174) (0.0132) (0.0114) 
Union Members / 1000 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0008
**
 -0.0002 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Black Population (%)   -0.0227 0.1558
**
 0.0399 
  (0.1127) (0.0723) (0.0471) 
Hispanic Population (%)  0.3416
**
 0.3610
***
 0.1734
***
 
  (0.1169) (0.0665) (0.0460) 
Immigrant Population (%)  -0.1950
**
 -0.1659
**
 -0.1581
**
 
  (0.0887) (0.0610) (0.0526) 
Observations 1236 1236 1236 1236 
R-Square 0.0687 0.2108 0.5606 0.7597 
Log-Likelihood Value -2723.74 -2621.44 -2259.58 -1886.60 
F Statistic 88.64 102.75 110.95 139.93 
C Statistic 0.85460 4.0446 1.9472 1.1266 
Hansen J Statistic 4.6644 4.6614 18.8785 31.2947 
Root Mean Square Error 2.1963 2.0243 1.5179 1.1281 
Notes:  
1. All specifications in each columns include MSA fixed effects.  
2. Column (3) includes percentages of various categories of age, marital status, education and ability to 
speak English.  
3. Column (4) includes year fixed effects in addition to variables in column (3).  
4. Standard errors clustered at the MSA-level are in parentheses.  
5. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 9 
Bivariate Probit (With Instrumental Variables) 
Homeownership Equation Estimates at Individual Level ACS Data, 2005-2011 
Independent Variable: Homeownership (= 1) 
Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Relative Cost 0.7193
***
 0.0814
**
 0.2496
***
 0.1181
***
  
 (0.0196) (0.0286) (0.0313) (0.0309)  
Mortgage Deduction (%) 0.0185
***
 0.0211
***
 0.0224
***
  0.0223
***
 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
Income (Log)  0.4544
***
 0.2922
***
 0.2896
***
 0.2923
***
 
  (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
MSA Union Membership (% ) -0.0035
***
 -0.0089
***
 -0.0105
***
 -0.0096
***
 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
MSA Population  -0.0982
***
 -0.0819
***
 -0.0851
***
 -0.0845
***
 
  (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Age (Years)   0.0903
***
 0.0907
***
 0.0903
***
 
   (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Age-square   -0.0006
***
 -0.0006
***
 -0.0006
***
 
   (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Married (= 1)   0.6053
***
 0.6061
***
 0.6053
***
 
   (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Female (= 1)   -0.0577
***
 -0.0577
***
 -0.0577
***
 
   (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Black (= 1)   -0.4944
***
 -0.4890
***
 -0.4935
***
 
   (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) 
Hispanics (= 1)   -0.1875
***
 -0.1999
***
 -0.1858
***
 
   (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) 
Family Size   0.1207
***
 0.1193
***
 0.1207
***
 
   (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Immigrant (= 1)   -0.6184
***
 -0.6231
***
 -0.6186
***
 
   (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0042) 
Speak English (= 1)   -0.2133
***
 -0.2141
***
 -0.2133
***
 
   (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0112) 
Education Dummies   Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0472
***
 -2.9953
***
 -4.7135
***
 -4.6484
***
 -4.5487
***
 
 (0.0101) (0.0245) (0.0319) (0.0317) (0.0244) 
Observations 3813571 3094956 3094956 3106531 3094956 
Notes:  
1. All specifications in each column include 8 year dummies.  
2. Columns (3), (4) and (5) include 5 education dummies. 
3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
4. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 10 
Bivariate Probit (With Instrumental Variables) 
Estimates at Individual Level ACS Data, 2005-2011 
Independent Variable: Unemployment (=1) 
Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Homeownership (= 1) -0.1707
***
 -0.2647
***
 -0.2576
***
 -0.2766
***
 -0.2556
***
 
 (0.0429) (0.0394) (0.0260) (0.0271) (0.0261) 
Income (Log)  -0.3784
***
 -0.4039
***
 -0.4022
***
 -0.4041
***
 
  (0.0071) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0030) 
MSA Union Membership (% ) 0.0058
***
 0.0058
***
 0.0058
***
 0.0059
***
 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
MSA Population (Log)   0.0041
**
 0.0105
***
 0.0101
***
 0.0105
***
 
  (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Age (Years)   0.0272
***
 0.0278
***
 0.0271
***
 
   (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Age-square   -0.0003
***
 -0.0003
***
 -0.0003
***
 
   (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Married (= 1)   -0.0815
***
 -0.0777
***
 -0.0819
***
 
   (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0068) 
Female (= 1)   0.1857
***
 0.1847
***
 0.1858
***
 
   (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
Black (=1)   0.0600
***
 0.0579
***
 0.0603
***
 
   (0.0066) (0.0067) (0.0066) 
Hispanics (= 1)    -0.0577
***
 -0.0589
***
 -0.0575
***
 
   (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) 
Family Size   0.0171
***
 0.0177
***
 0.0170
***
 
   (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Immigrant (= 1)   -0.2019
***
 -0.2055
***
 -0.2015
***
 
   (0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0090) 
Speak English (= 1)   -0.0066 -0.0073 -0.0065 
   (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
Education Dummies    Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.5535
***
 2.0474
***
 1.5297
***
 1.5100
***
 1.5315
***
 
 (0.0239) (0.0337) (0.0435) (0.0441) (0.0435) 
Observations 3813571 3094956 3094956 3106531 3094956 
Wald Statistics for Model 20829 216761 550588 552270 550465 
− Log-likelihood  356386446 248550237 209959806 211253310 209965475 
Rho -0.1335 0.0994 0.0945 0.1054 0.0933 
Wald Test for Comparison 24.9379 17.4784 38.0325 43.7803 36.8431 
Notes:  
1. All specifications in each column include 8 year dummies.  
2. Columns (3), (4) and (5) include 5 education dummies. 
3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
4. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 11 
Bivariate Probit (Without Instrumental Variables) 
Estimates at Individual Level ACS Data, 2005-2011 
Independent Variable: Homeownership (= 1) 
Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Homeownership (= 1) -0.0659
***
 -0.4053
***
 -0.2754
***
 
 (0.0046) (0.0365) (0.0272) 
Income (Log)  -0.3535
***
 -0.4023
***
 
  (0.0068) (0.0031) 
MSA Union Membership (% )  0.0055
***
 0.0058
***
 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) 
MSA Population (Log)  -0.0010 0.0101
***
 
  (0.0019) (0.0016) 
Age (Years)   0.0278
***
 
   (0.0014) 
Age-square   -0.0003
***
 
   (0.00001) 
Married   -0.0780
***
 
   (0.0070) 
Female (= 1)   0.1847
***
 
   (0.0039) 
Black (= 1)   0.0581
***
 
   (0.0067) 
Hispanics (= 1)   -0.0588
***
 
   (0.0060) 
Family Size   0.0177
***
 
   (0.0017) 
Immigrant (= 1)   -0.2053
***
 
   (0.0090) 
Speak English (= 1)   -0.0073 
   (0.0161) 
Education Dummies   Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.6084
***
 1.9609
***
 1.5110
***
 
 (0.0046) (0.0331) (0.0441) 
Observations 3825961 3106531 3106531 
Wald Statistics for Model 12872.47 221542.49 552197.47 
Log-likelihood  -358325629 -250058995.7 -211254596.6 
Rho -0.1976 0.1831 0.1047 
Wald Test for Comparison 6490.26 69.32 43.06 
Notes:  
1. All specifications in each column include 8 year dummies.  
2. Columns (3) includes 5 education dummies. 
3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
4. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 12 
Probit Estimates at Individual Level ACS Data, 2005-2011 
Independent Variable: Homeownership (= 1) 
Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Homeownership (= 1) -0.3871
***
 -0.1005
***
 -0.0982
***
 
 (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0043) 
Income (Log)  -0.4062
***
 -0.4183
***
 
  (0.0016) (0.0017) 
MSA Union Membership (% )  0.0060
***
 0.0064
***
 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) 
MSA Population (Log)  0.0102
***
 0.0146
***
 
  (0.0014) (0.0015) 
Age (Years)   0.0232
***
 
   (0.0012) 
Age-square   -0.0003
***
 
   (0.00001) 
Married (= 1)   -0.1127
***
 
   (0.0047) 
Female (= 1)   0.1889
***
 
   (0.0039) 
Black (= 1)   0.0852
***
 
   (0.0052) 
Hispanics (= 1)   -0.0478
***
 
   (0.0058) 
Family Size (= 1)   0.0115
***
 
   (0.0015) 
Immigrant (= 1)   -0.1719
***
 
   (0.0075) 
Speak English (= 1)   0.0033 
   (0.0161) 
Education Dummies   Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.4252
***
 2.1429
***
 1.6630
***
 
 (0.0043) (0.0234) (0.0365) 
Observations 3825961 3106531 3106531 
Chi-square 33355.95808 75713.97152 77766.54416 
Pseudo R-square .0300922032 .1296800925 .1375058651 
Log-likelihood  -87979310.17 -47312717.86 -46887289.73 
Notes:  
1. All specifications in each column include 8 year dummies.  
2. Columns (3) includes 5 education dummies. 
3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
4. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 13 
Linear Probability Model Estimates at Individual Level ACS Data, 2005-2011 
Independent Variable: Homeownership (= 1) 
Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Homeownership (= 1) -0.0464
***
 -0.0012
***
 -0.0042
***
 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Income (Log)  -0.0453
***
 -0.0499
***
 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) 
MSA Union Membership (% )  0.0006
***
 0.0006
***
 
  (0.00002) (0.00002) 
MSA Population (Log)  0.0020
***
 0.0023
***
 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Age   0.0027
***
 
   (0.0001) 
Age-square   -0.00003
***
 
   (0.000001) 
Married (= 1)   -0.0085
***
 
   (0.0004) 
Female (= 1)   0.0206
***
 
   (0.0003) 
Black (= 1)   0.0069
***
 
   (0.0005) 
Hispanics (= 1)   -0.0089
***
 
   (0.0005) 
Family Size   0.0013
***
 
   (0.0001) 
Immigrant (= 1)   -0.0187
***
 
   (0.0006) 
Speak English   -0.0047
**
 
   (0.0018) 
Education Dummies   Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0799
***
 0.4779
***
 0.4502
***
 
 (0.00003) (0.0028) (0.0040) 
Observations 3825961 3106531 3106531 
F-statistic 3866.79 4058.02 1817.29 
R-square 0.01365 0.05456 0.05894 
Adjusted R-square 0.01365 0.05455 0.05893 
Log-likelihood 155906 803907 811119 
Root Mean Square Error 0.23231 0.1868 0.1864 
Notes:  
1. All specifications in each column include 8 year dummies.  
2. Columns (3) includes 5 education dummies. 
3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
4. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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CHAPTER II: 
THE EFFECT OF HOMEOWNERSHIP ON UNEMPLOYMENT SPELLS: EVIDENCE 
FROM US DATA 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this study, I investigate the effect of homeownership on unemployment spells. 
Understanding the nature of this relationship is important for policy purposes because there are 
institutional policies that encourage homeownership. For example, in most states in the US, 
homeowners are given favorable tax treatment compared to renters as they are allowed mortgage 
deductions. 
Few studies have looked at this relationship using the US data (Coulson and Fisher, 2002; 
Valleta, 2013). None have considered the different types of re-employment (part-time and full-
time). However, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that in 1968 there were 13.5% of 
US employees who were part-time workers. This number has risen to 17.0% in January 2000 to a 
peak of 20.1% in January 2010. In May 2013 the percentage of the workforce that is part-time 
declined a little to 19.2%. In November 2014 this further declined a little to 18.9%. The high 
percentage of workers exiting from unemployment into part-time employment deserves emphasis 
in empirical studies. Also, as noted in Goss and Phillips (2007), homeowners with weak housing 
equity would may exits faster into part-time employment to enable them fulfill their mortgage 
obligations. Hence, analyzing different exits from unemployment into full-time and part-time 
employment would provide new empirical insight into the nature of the relationship between 
unemployment spells and homeownership. Consequently, the distinction should not be ignored. 
Flatau et al. (2003) have done their empirical analysis in the same line of discussion using 
Australian data.  
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The main contribution to the literature of this study is to investigate the impact of 
homeownership on unemployment spells for different types of re-employment. In estimating this 
relationship, two important points must be noted. First, the choice of being a homeowner may be 
endogenous due to selection of a person into owning or renting. An unemployed person may 
examine her future job prospects and decide to rent rather than own a home. For example, 
Moriizumi and Naoi (2011) find unemployment risk delays the timing of homeownership. 
Second, a homeowner may just prefer stability and decide not to take distant jobs for reasons 
other than homeownership. Failure to account for these selection issues would result in 
parameter identification problems. 
To deal with these selection issues and possible endogeneity problems, I account for 
unobserved heterogeneity in my estimation by using mixed and competing risks models. Gaure 
and Zhang (2007) and Nicoletti and Rondinelli (2010) note that identification problems usually 
arise in duration models when one does not fully control for heterogeneity. Across all the various 
models estimated, when different types of re-employment are not taken into consideration, 
homeowners are found to stay unemployed longer than renters. When different types of re-
employment are considered, homeowners compared to renters stay unemployed longer when 
exiting into full-time employment but stay unemployed shorter when exiting into part-time 
employment. 
The rest of this study is organized as follows: section 2 presents a brief literature review 
on homeownership and unemployment spells. Section 3 presents the data and descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Oswald (1999) finds that homeowners are more likely to stay unemployed longer because 
homeowners are less mobile. Coulson and Grieco (2013) note that this immobility is most likely 
due to transaction cost associated with selling a home. Catte et al (2004) find that in the US this 
transaction cost for sales of medium-sized houses is around 9%  of the sales price. 
Empirical studies after Oswald (1999) provide mixed results on the relationship between 
homeownership and unemployment spells. Some studies find homeowners compared to renters 
to have a higher rate of staying in unemployment longer. Other studies find homeowners to have 
lower exit rates than renters. For example, Brunet and Lesueur (2009) find homeowners stay 
unemployed longer than renters. Van Vuuren and Leuvensteij (2007) also find homeownership 
to have negative but insignificant impact on exiting unemployment to non-local labor markets. 
Flatau et al. (2003) find outright owners, especially females, have significantly lower exits from 
unemployment, especially to full time employment. Lower exit rate from unemployment for 
homeowners is also found by Kantor et al (2013). There is similar finding in Annenberg (2011). 
On the contrary, van Vuuren (2009) finds homeowners have higher probability of leaving 
unemployment. Munch et al. (2006) find that homeownership lowers the propensity to move 
geographically for jobs while unemployed. However, the positive effect on the exit rate out of 
unemployment in the local labor market dominates the negative effect of lower propensity to 
move, such that the overall hazard rate is higher for homeowners compared to renters. Battu et 
al. (2009) also find no support that homeownership increases unemployment duration.  Similar 
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conclusions have been reached by other studies (Coulson, 2002; van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 
2009). 
According to Goss and Phillips (2007) the higher exit rates out of unemployment by 
homeowners may be due to weak housing equity that require quick re-employment to enable the 
homeowners to continue making their mortgage payments. As a result, homeowners ask for 
lower reservation wages compared to equivalent qualified renters. Another reason may be that 
firms locate to places where homeownership is high since homeowners with lower reservation 
wages reduce the production cost of firms and also increase employment for homeowners.  
Estimating the exit rate out of unemployment, Baert et al. (2013) categorize individuals 
into outright homeowners, homeowners with mortgage payments, and tenants. They find that 
homeowners with a mortgage exit unemployment first. Outright owners stay unemployed the 
longest while tenants take an intermediate position. 
Valleta (2013) on the other hand, finds no support for lower or higher exit rate out of 
unemployment for homeowners by using a model developed by Guell and Hu (2006). He notes 
that job seekers, whether they are homeowners or renters faced uniformly weak employment 
opportunities in almost every area of the country in recent years. 
The mixed results may be due to the fact that some of these studies have failed to address 
selection bias and possible endogeneity problems. For example, Coulson and Fischer (2002) do 
not account for potential selection bias present in their estimation. Munch et al. (2006) note that 
this selection bias can arise because some households are inherently less mobile than others. As a 
result these households are more likely to be homeowners as the fixed costs associated with 
buying and selling a house are amortized over a longer period, and so user costs are lower. 
Hence, in the event of unforeseen unemployment, these households might be less willing to 
   63 
 
move for a job, but this is not because of their choice of housing. Rather, it should be attributed 
to the household’s preference for stability. In other words, tenure choice is endogenous to the 
process that describes individual labor market transitions and failure to take that into account can 
result in inconsistent estimates of the effect of homeownership on the exit rate from 
unemployment. 
However, some studies address the selection and endogeneity issues. For example, 
Brunet and Lesueur (2003) address the selection bias issue by using a lognormal duration model 
that used the predicted value of homeownership from a multinomial logit model. To account for 
unobserved heterogeneity, Brunet and Lesueur (2003) use a gamma distribution in an estimation 
framework similar to Heckman (1979).  
Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) use a non-parametric method introduced by 
Heckman and Singer (1984) to minimize the impact of distributional assumptions. To allow for 
unobserved heterogeneity, they used a mixed-proportional model and address the endogeneity 
bias by modeling the homeownership equation as logit. However, their instrument which is 
regional homeownership rate is not truly exogenous to unemployment spells. 
Munch et al. (2006) in a framework similar to van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004), use a 
competing model risk model with the homeownership equation modeled as logit. Kantor, 
Nijkamp and Rouwendahl (2013) also use competing risks but model the homeownership 
equation as a multinomial logit. Flatau et al. (2003) also use a competing model but the 
homeownership equation is modeled as a probit. Baert et al. (2013) simultaneously estimate a 
mixed proportional hazard model for being an outright homeowner, a homeowner with mortgage 
payments and a tenant. To be able to correctly identify the causal influence of different types of 
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housing tenure on unemployment duration, they also use an exclusion restriction in the 
homeownership equation.  
Apart from Flatau et al. (2003) who use Australian data, none of these studies have 
considered homeowners exiting from unemployment into different types of employment. The 
current study considers exiting into different types of employment as does Flatau et al. (2003) 
but use the US Current Population Survey data for estimations. To correct for endogeneity and 
selection bias, I introduce heterogeneity in my models and also use control function method as in 
Flatau et al. (2003), Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) and Baert et al. (2013).  
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DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The main data set for this study is the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1990 
to 2013. The data set is obtained from the IPUMS-CPS database. To make cross-time 
comparisons using the March CPS data more feasible, variables in IPUMS-CPS are coded 
identically or "harmonized" for various years. In extracting the data set from the IPUMS-CPS 
database, I remove individuals categorized as children and individuals in the armed forces; 
individuals who were seeking their first time jobs and are categorized as unemployed; and 
individuals who are not in the labor force. The remaining individuals in the data set consist of 
those who are:  i  experienced unemployed workers with unemployment duration greater than 
zero;  ii  between 18 years and 65 years; and  iii  who work for wages and salary. The final 
data consists of 108,076  observations. I also make use of sample weights to produce 
representative statistics.
4
  
Unemployment spells labeled in the IPUM-CPS DURUNEMP indicates for how many 
consecutive weeks each currently unemployed respondent had been without a job and looking 
for work. If a respondent had not done any work for pay or profit during the preceding week, did 
not have a job from which he or she was temporarily absent, and had been actively looking for 
                                                 
4
 Due to the complex sampling design for the CPS, users of IPUMS-CPS data must make use of weights to produce 
representative statistics. Most analyses based on individual-level March data should use the WTSUPP variable. 
WTSUPP is based on the inverse probability of selection into the sample and adjustments for the following factors: 
failure to obtain an interview; sampling within large sample units; the known distribution of the entire population 
according to age, sex, and race; over-sampling Hispanic persons; to give husbands and wives the same weight; and 
an additional step to provide consistency with labor force estimates from the basic survey. WTSUPP is the person-
level weight that is available for questions that were not part of the basic monthly survey questions asked every 
month in the CPS (King, M. et al., 2010). 
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work in the past four weeks, the interviewer asked, "How many weeks have you been looking for 
work?" and "How many weeks ago did you start looking?" The variable FULLPART indicates 
whether respondents who were employed during the previous calendar year worked full-time or 
part-time. Full-time work is defined as thirty-five hours a week or more. This variable helps to 
identify individuals who exit into full-time and part-time re-employment when different exits out 
of unemployment are considered.  
Tables 1 and 2 report the summary statistics of the CPS variables. The entire sample 
consists of 54.49%  homeowners, the average unemployment spell being 21.29  weeks with 
21.87  and 20.59 weeks for homeowners and renters, respectively. For the entire sample 84.81%  
of all individuals are re-employed while 82.55% of homeowners and 87.51% of renters are re-
employed.  
When the types of employment are considered, 70.55%  of homeowners and 76.65%  of 
renters exit into full-time re-employment while 73.33%  of all individuals are re-employed as 
full-time workers. There are also 8.80% of homeowners and 7.09%  of renters who are re-
employed as part-time workers. For the entire sample 8.02%  of all individuals are re-employed 
as part-time workers. 
Table 2 also reveals that of the individuals who move within states for new jobs, there are 
1.35%  of homeowners and 3.07%  of renters. There are  0.11%  of homeowners and 0.51%  of 
renters who move out of states for new jobs. Homeowners on average are older than renters as 
shown by Table 2. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of spells of unemployment. The histogram shows the data 
is right skewed. One implication of the skewness of the data is that the median will describe the 
central tendency better than the mean. From the histogram, the spells of unemployment for 
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individuals who have not experienced re-employment are censored at 98 weeks. There are also 
spells of unemployment for some individuals that are truncated since they are unemployed 
before the data collection begun. All these issues informed the choice of estimation strategies 
that are used later in the paper.  
Figure 2 shows the Cox proportional hazards.
5
 The exit rates out unemployment decline 
at first for both homeowners and renters but rises again around the 75th week towards the end of 
the unemployment spell. Initially, the exit rate for renters is greater than that for homeowners. 
However, around the 58th week the rate of exiting unemployment for homeowners becomes 
greater than that for renters towards the end of the unemployment spell. This may imply the 
unemployed homeowner initially takes her time to search for job as her home serves as equity. 
However, as time passes, the equity of the unemployed homeowner becomes weak such that this 
makes the unemployed homeowner to intensively search for job increasing her probability of exit 
out of unemployment. A similar reason is given by Goss and Phillips (2007).  
Figure 3 presents the probability of exit into full-time employment. The Figure shows 
similar pattern as the full sample when the types of re-employment are not considered. It is 
difficult to draw conclusion from this graph on the overall exit rate from unemployment into full-
time re-employment for homeowners. Since, it appears that homeowners have a lower exit rate 
during the immediate weeks after being unemployed, but the exit rate becomes greater than the 
exit rate for renters the longer the period of unemployment. However, the graphs for part-time 
re-employment show different patterns. Figure 4 shows the exit rates out of unemployment into 
part-time re-employment decline at first for both homeowners and renters but rises again around 
                                                 
5
 The hazard is probability of experiencing an event at time 
it  conditional on having survived to time .it  The 
hazards in the context of this paper are the exit or escape rates out of unemployment. The Cox proportional hazard 
are non-parametric estimates that do not make any assumption about the distribution of unemployment spells. 
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the 75th week towards the end of the unemployment spell. The overall rate of exit from 
unemployment for homeowners is greater than that for renters at any point of the unemployment 
spell. The implication of Figure 4 is that when it comes to exiting unemployment into part-time 
re-employment, homeowners are less likely to stay in unemployment longer.  
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METHODOLOGY 
To estimate the effect of homeownership on unemployment spells, I specified a general 
parametric duration model. Let ( )t be the hazard function for experiencing re-employment at 
time .t  I adopt a standard duration model from Cameron and Trivedi (2005) with a general 
hazard function of the form given by  
 
0( | , ) ( , ) ( )i i it H X t H X         
(
(13) 
 
where t  is the time to re-employment measured as the number of weeks before an unemployed 
individual is re-employed; 
0  is the baseline hazard common to all individuals; H is 
homeownership status; X represents individual demographic characteristics such as age, gender, 
race, number of children, household size, marital status, citizenship status, education level and 
other control variables such as experience, union membership, region of location  and year of job 
displacement. The likelihood function of this general parametric model is given by equation (2) 
 1
{ ( | , , )} { ( | , , )}
( , , )
( | , , )
i id d
i i i i i i
i
i i i
S t H X f t H X
L
S t H X
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
(
(2) 
 
where ( | .)if t  is the density function of the assumed distribution, ( | .)iS t  is the corresponding 
survivor function, and 
0( , , , )i i it t d X  are the information on the ith  observation. The parameters 
,   and   are estimated from the data:  is the coefficient on homeownership, 
i  are the 
coefficients on ,X  and   are ancillary parameters, if any, required by the assumed distribution. 
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Three parametric models are estimated: exponential, Weibull and Cox Proportional Hazard 
models. 
Endogeneity arises if the choice of owning a home or renting is correlated with the 
transition from unemployment into employment.  To handle this issue, I further account for 
unobserved heterogeneity in the model. To allow for unobserved heterogeneity, I re-specify 
equation (1) as 
 
0( | , , ) ( , ) ( ) , 0i i i it H X v t H X v v          
(
(3) 
 
where the additional v  denotes an unobserved heterogeneity for observation .i  A parametric 
distribution of v  is usually specified. To satisfy 0iv  , I used two distributions with support on 
the positive line: gamma and inverse-Gaussian distributions (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005 for 
details). 
I also consider exiting into employment specified as competing risks hazard model. Here, 
two transitions are considered: the unemployed can exit unemployment into a full-time 
employment or part-time employment. Each of the destination specific hazard ,j p f  ( p  is 
part-time and f  is full-time) is the product of the baseline hazard and a function of observed 
characteristics, ,X  an indicator of homeownership status, ,H  and unobserved heterogeneity jv  
given as 
 
0( | , , ) ( , ) ( ) , ,i j i i jt H X v t H X v j p f          
(
(4) 
 
where the baseline hazards are specified flexibly, as both 0 ( , )p t   and 0 ( , ).f t   To account for 
the possible endogeneity of homeownership, I specify the unobserved multiplicative 
heterogeneity terms to have a joint distribution.  
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To further take care of the possible endogeneity, I followed Flatau et al (2003), Munch et 
al (2006) and Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) by assuming that homeownership, ,H  follows a 
probit specification:                            
  Pr( 1| , )i i i iH M X M X       ((5) 
 
where M is the state mortgage deduction rate and serves an exclusion restriction (see detail 
discussion in Glaeser and Shapiro (2003); Coulson and Fisher (2009))  and X is the same vector 
of explanatory variables in equation (1). Homeowners are provided with special state income tax 
treatment. This treatment is not available to renters; therefore, cash flows for renters are the same 
on a before- and after-tax basis. The tax treatment for a homeowner includes deductions for 
property tax and mortgage interest. These deductions reduce the owner’s state income tax 
payment and, therefore, reduce the cost of homeownership. Hence, an increase in the state 
mortgage deduction encourages an individual to own a home.  
Consistent estimates of the effect of homeownership on unemployment spells can be 
obtained by rewriting equation (4) as   
 
0( | , , ) ( , ) ( ) , ,i j i i i jt H X v t H X v j p f           
(
(6) 
 
where the additional variable 
i  is the “Inverse Mills Ratio” from equation (5). The “Inverse 
Mills Ratio” is computed as ( ) ( )i i i i iM X M X          where     denotes the 
standard normal probability function, and     denotes the cumulative distribution function for 
a standard normal random variable. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Full Sample Estimation Results 
I considered three parametric regression models using the covariates homeownership, 
age, race, family income, unemployment benefit, union membership, household size, number of 
children, gender, citizenship status, marital status, education level, year and region dummies.
6
 
The three parametric models are exponential, Weibull, and Cox PH.
7
  The Weibull model 
provides the best fit. As can be seen from Table 3, the fit of the Weibull model explains positive 
state dependence since 1  ; that is, the probability of the unemployment spell terminating 
increases as the unemployment spell lengthens. 
For all the models considered, homeownership and other explanatory variables are 
significant. The estimated coefficient of homeownership is negative for all models, implying that 
the unemployment spell of homeowners terminates more slowly relative to renters. There is little 
variation of estimates of homeownership across different models.  The corresponding hazard 
ratio of the coefficient on homeownership for the Weibull model is 0.9040.  This hazard ratio 
means that being a homeowner decreases the exit rate out of unemployment by 9.6%  over the 
baseline exit rate. Similarly, for the exponential and Cox PH models, the rates of exit out of 
unemployment decreases by 9.37%  and 8.84%,  respectively. 
The results obtained above ignore unobserved heterogeneity.  I use a graph to examine 
the possibility of the presence of unobserved heterogeneity by looking at the estimated fit of the 
                                                 
6
 There are 4 marriage dummies, 5 education dummies, 24 year dummies and 9 region dummies. 
7
 These models are estimated parsimoniously and coefficient on homeownership consistently significant.  
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model. This evaluation is done by plotting the empirical cumulative hazard function against the 
generalized residuals. For a correctly specified model, the plot should exhibit an approximate 
straight line with slope one (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  
Figure 5 shows the generalized residual plots for the Weibull with and without gamma 
and inverse-Gaussian heterogeneities. As can be seen from the three graphs, the fit of the 
Weibull model improves a lot with gamma heterogeneity. This shows evidence of significant 
unobserved heterogeneity. Introduction of inverse-Gaussian heterogeneity only improves the 
model marginally. The presence of unobserved heterogeneity and the correction for any possible 
endogeneity have a large impact on duration dependence:  29.20%  and 63.79%  for gamma 
heterogeneity and inverse-Gaussian heterogeneity, respectively, as can be seen from Table 4. 
This implies a more steeply rising exit rate out of unemployment than was the case when 
unobserved heterogeneity was ignored. Hence, without heterogeneity, the effect of 
homeownership on unemployment spell is underestimated. Also, the log-likelihood has 
improved. The coefficient on homeownership remains negative and significant across the three 
models. 
In addition to the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity, I corrected for any possible 
endogeneity. Table 5 shows the first stage probit results from which the “Inverse Mills Ratios” 
are computed and used in the second stage regressions. As can be seen from the Table, the 
coefficients on mortgage deduction have the correct signs and are statistically significant. The 
positive sign implies that an increase in mortgage deduction will increase the probability of 
homeownership. The control function parameter estimates are presented in Table 6. The 
probability of exiting unemployment for homeowners compared to renters decreases by 13.84%
for the Gamma heterogeneity model and 15.39% for the Inverse-Gaussian heterogeneity model.  
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Full-time Estimation Results 
The above analysis ignores the exit from unemployment into different types of re-
employment. I consider exiting from unemployment into full-time and part-time employment by 
re-estimating the models above separately. Table 7 reports the results of the full-time re-
employment estimates. The fit of the Weibull model explains positive state dependence since
1  ; that is, the probability of the spell terminating into full-time employment increases as the 
spell lengthens. The estimated coefficient of homeownership is negative for all models, implying 
that the unemployment spell of homeowners terminates more slowly into full-time employment 
than renters. There is also little variation of estimates of homeownership across different models. 
Homeownership has a hazard ratio of 0.8787  for the Weibull model meaning that being a 
homeowner decreases the exit rate from unemployment by nearly 12.13%  over the baseline exit 
rate when transitioning into full-time employment. Similarly, for the exponential and Cox PH 
models, the exit rate decreases by about 11.77%  and 11.41%,  respectively. 
Figure 6 shows the generalized residual plots for the Weibull with and without gamma 
and inverse-Gaussian heterogeneity. As can be seen from the three graphs, the fit of the Weibull 
model improves a lot with gamma heterogeneity. This shows evidence of significant unobserved 
heterogeneity. Introduction of inverse-Gaussian heterogeneity only improves the model 
marginally.   
The presence of unobserved heterogeneity has a large impact on duration dependence:  
27.58%  and 64.93%  for gamma and inverse-Gaussian heterogeneities, respectively, as reported 
in Table 8. This implies a more steeply rising exit rate out of unemployment into full-time 
employment than was the case of when unobserved heterogeneity is not considered. Hence, 
without heterogeneity, the effect of homeownership on unemployment spell is underestimated.  
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Table 9 reports the control function estimates. As can be seen from the Table, the rate of exit out 
of unemployment for homeowners is less steep compared to when I only control for 
heterogeneity. 
Part-time Estimation Results 
The three parametric models of exponential, Weibull, and Cox PH are also estimated for 
part-time re-employment. As can be seen from Table 10, the fit of the Weibull model explains 
negative state dependence since 1  ; that is, the probability of the spell terminating into part-
time employment decreases as the spell lengthens. 
For all the models, homeownership and other explanatory variables are significant. The 
estimated coefficient on homeownership is positive for all models, implying that the 
unemployment spell of homeowners terminates faster into part-time employment than renters. 
There is little variation of estimates of homeownership across different models. The hazard ratio 
of the coefficients on homeownership is 1.2250  for the Weibull model. This means that being a 
homeowner increases the exit rate from unemployment by nearly 22.50%  over the baseline exit 
rate when transitioning into part-time employment. Similarly, for the exponential and Cox PH 
models, the exit rate increases by about 21.83%  and 23.87%,  respectively. 
Figure 7 shows the generalized residual plots for the Weibull model with and without 
gamma and inverse-Gaussian heterogeneities. As can be seen from the three graphs, the fit of the 
Weibull model improves a lot with inverse-Gaussian heterogeneity. This shows evidence of 
significant unobserved heterogeneity. Introduction of gamma heterogeneity only improves the 
model marginally.   
The presence of unobserved heterogeneity has a large impact on duration dependence, 
changing from a negative duration dependence to a positive duration dependence with an 
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increase of about 27.92%   and 55.07%  for gamma heterogeneity and inverse-Gaussian 
heterogeneities, respectively, as reported in Table 11. This implies a change from a more flat to a 
more steeply rising exit rate out of unemployment into part-time employment when I accounted 
for unobserved heterogeneity. The exit rate out of unemployment for homeowners becomes 
larger when control function method is used as reported in Table 12. 
Estimations Results from Competing Risk Model 
I also modeled the two transition types jointly and estimated the hazard functions by 
using competing risk models. There are 78,074  and 8997  transitions for full-time and part-time 
employment, respectively. For each transition, I estimated Weibull model with and without 
heterogeneity.  Table 13 reports the results from the competing risk model estimations. 
The introduction of unobserved heterogeneity in the Weibull model leads to a substantial 
increase in the estimate of hazard function slopes. The coefficient increase from 1.07  to 1.37  for 
full-time re-employment and from 0.88  to 1.13  for part-time re-employment in the case of 
gamma heterogeneity. That is the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity leads to a stronger 
indication of increasing duration dependence or steeply rising exit rate out of unemployment. 
Homeownership decreases exit rate from unemployment for homeowners seeking full-time 
employment but increases exit rate from unemployment for homeowners seeking part-time 
employment. When unobserved heterogeneity is introduced in the Weibull model, both the 
gamma and inverse-Gaussian estimates of homeownership become larger and are comparable for 
full-time and part-time re-employment, respectively.  
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CONCLUSION 
This paper contributes to the literature on the effect of homeownership on unemployment 
spell by investigating exiting into different types of re-employment instead of aggregating re-
employment. I account for unobserved heterogeneity in both mixed and competing risk models 
to correct for selection bias and possible endogeneity bias. Across all the models, when transition 
from unemployment into different types of employment is ignored, homeowners are more likely 
to stay unemployed longer than renters. When the transition into different types of employment 
is considered, homeowners stay unemployed longer when seeking full-time employment but are 
less likely to stay unemployed longer when seeking part-time employment.  
Staying unemployed longer by homeowners can be due to waiting for better match. A 
better match can raise productivity by reducing turnover, increasing coordination between 
workers and management, and by increasing the motivation of workers. More productive 
workers means a higher marginal product of labor that leads to higher wages and lower 
unemployment rate.  
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Unemployment Spell 21.29 24.84 1.00 98.00 
Employment 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Full-time Employment 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Part-time Employment 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Homeownership Status 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Log of Wage Income 10.36 1.01 -0.30 13.82 
Household Size 3.04 1.73 1.00 25.00 
Number of Children 0.75 1.14 0.00 9.00 
Female 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Age 35.66 12.46 18.00 65.00 
Unemployment Benefit 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Education 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Experience 3.08 6.56 1.00 25.00 
Black 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Hispanics 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Job Migration within State 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Job Migration out of State 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Citizenship status 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Population 16.04 0.91 13.04 17.45 
Union Membership 1.27 0.68 0.00 3.84 
Marital Status 
Single 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Married 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Separated 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Divorced 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Widowed 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Region of Residence 
New England  0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Middle Atlantic  0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
East North Central  0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
West North Central 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
South Atlantic 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
East South Central 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
West South Central 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Mountain 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Pacific 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Sample Size 108076 
Note:  
1. The excluded categories are single for marital status and New England for region of residence. 
2. Year of unemployment dummies are omitted from the table.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics by Homeownership Status 
Variable Homeowner Renter Total 
Unemployment Spell (Mean) 21.87 20.59 21.29 
Employment (%) 82.55 87.51 84.81 
Full-time Employment (%) 70.55 76.65 73.33 
Part-time Employment (%) 8.8 7.09 8.02 
Homeowners (%)   54.49 
Log of Wage Income (Mean) 10.66 9.98 10.36 
Household Size (Mean) 3.25 2.78 3.04 
Number of Children (Mean) 0.7 0.81 0.75 
Male (%) 61.94 55.88 59.18 
Age (mean) 37.74 33.18 35.66 
Unemployment Benefit (%) 28.42 21.23 25.15 
Education (%) 44.04 33.14 39.08 
Experience  3.08 3.08 3.08 
Black (%) 15.54 28.76 21.52 
Hispanics (%) 11.99 22.56 16.8 
Job Migration within State (%) 1.35 3.07 2.13 
Job Migration out of State (%) 0.11 0.51 0.29 
Citizenship status (%) 20.88 30.04 25.05 
Union Membership (%) 28.42 21.23 25.15 
Marital Status 
Single (%) 39.09 48.84 43.53 
Married (%) 45.11 32.2 39.23 
Separated (%) 2.88 5.34 4 
Divorced (%) 11.4 12.46 11.88 
Widowed (%) 1.53 1.16 1.36 
Region of Residence 
New England (%) 5.31 4.54 4.96 
Middle Atlantic (%) 14.12 14.66 14.37 
East North Central (%) 19.08 14.71 17.09 
West North Central (%) 6.3 5.19 5.79 
South Atlantic (%) 17.07 16.3 16.72 
East South Central (%) 6.39 5.14 5.82 
West South Central (%) 9.68 10.46 10.03 
Mountain (%) 6.01 5.89 5.95 
Pacific (%) 16.04 23.11 19.26 
Note:  
1. The excluded categories are single for marital status and New England for region of residence. 
2. Dummies for year of unemployment are omitted from the table 
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Table 3 
Parameters Estimates from Three Parametric Models, 1990-2013 
Dependent variable: Unemployment Duration 
Model Exponential Weibull Cox PH 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Homeownership -0.098
***
 -0.101
***
 -0.093
***
 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Income 0.183
***
 0.192
***
 0.171
***
 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Unemployment benefit -0.430
***
 -0.434
***
 -0.409
***
 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Union membership 0.052
***
 0.055
***
 0.049
***
 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Less than high school -0.062 -0.066 -0.056 
 (0.074) (0.077) (0.071) 
High school -0.135
*
 -0.144
*
 -0.124
*
 
 (0.074) (0.077) (0.071) 
Less than college degree -0.073 -0.081 -0.059 
 (0.074) (0.077) (0.071) 
College degree -0.114 -0.127 -0.093 
 (0.075) (0.078) (0.072) 
Graduate degree -0.155
**
 -0.169
**
 -0.132
*
 
 (0.076) (0.080) (0.073) 
Households size -0.070
***
 -0.074
***
 -0.065
***
 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Number of Children 0.056
***
 0.059
***
 0.051
***
 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Female -0.175
***
 -0.178
***
 -0.172
***
 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age -0.017
***
 -0.018
***
 -0.016
***
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Citizenship status 0.250
***
 0.261
***
 0.237
***
 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) 
Black -0.153
***
 -0.162
***
 -0.142
***
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Hispanic origin -0.082
***
 -0.087
***
 -0.079
***
 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) 
Number of observations 98380 98380 98380 
Auxiliary Parameter ( )  - 1.0380 - 
Log-likelihood -224626983 -224352265 -2494864728 
Chi-square 17777 14076 13517 
Notes:  
1. Each column includes 4 marriage dummies, 8 regional dummies and 23 year dummies. 
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 4 
Weibull Parameter Estimates with and without Heterogeneity, 1990-2013 
Dependent Variable: Unemployment Duration 
Distribution No Heterogeneity Gamma  Inverse-Gaussian 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Homeownership -0.1009
***
 -0.1506
***
 -0.1690
***
 
 (0.0103) (0.0135) (0.0163) 
Income 0.1921
***
 0.2672
***
 0.3114
***
 
 (0.0053) (0.0071) (0.0086) 
Unemployment benefit -0.4339
***
 -0.8002
***
 -0.8748
***
 
 (0.0093) (0.0175) (0.0154) 
Union membership 0.0554
***
 0.0803
***
 0.0944
***
 
 (0.0130) (0.0160) (0.0200) 
Less than high school -0.0664 -0.0766 -0.1154 
 (0.0766) (0.1128) (0.1229) 
High school -0.1438
*
 -0.1838 -0.2413
*
 
 (0.0768) (0.1131) (0.1232) 
Less than college degree -0.0809 -0.0926 -0.1297 
 (0.0769) (0.1133) (0.1235) 
College degree -0.1265 -0.1674 -0.2135
*
 
 (0.0778) (0.1144) (0.1249) 
Graduate degree -0.1688
**
 -0.2583
**
 -0.3048
**
 
 (0.0797) (0.1168) (0.1280) 
Households size -0.0740
***
 -0.0986
***
 -0.1176
***
 
 (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0061) 
Number of Children 0.0591
***
 0.0850
***
 0.0960
***
 
 (0.0055) (0.0072) (0.0087) 
Female -0.1781
***
 -0.2626
***
 -0.3124
***
 
 (0.0094) (0.0123) (0.0149) 
Age -0.0178
***
 -0.0233
***
 -0.0286
***
 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) 
Citizenship status 0.2611
***
 0.3891
***
 0.4318
***
 
 (0.0168) (0.0222) (0.0263) 
Black -0.1618
***
 -0.2247
***
 -0.2704
***
 
 (0.0124) (0.0165) (0.0198) 
Hispanic origin -0.0865
***
 -0.1041
***
 -0.1248
***
 
 (0.0138) (0.0178) (0.0216) 
Number of observation 98380 98380 98380 
Auxiliary Parameter ( )  1.0480 1.3540 1.7164 
Log-likelihood -224352265 -221637205 -220232078 
Chi-square 14076 10427 14176 
Notes:  
1. Each column includes 4 marriage dummies, 8 regional dummies and 23 year dummies. 
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 5 
Probit Estimates, 1990-2013 
Dependent Variable: Homeownership 
Independent Variables Pooled Full-time Part-time 
Mortgage Deduction 0.2314
***
 0.2881
***
 0.3627
***
 
 (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0066) 
Income 0.3535
***
 0.3279
***
 0.4720
***
 
 (0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0327) 
Unemployment benefit 0.0751
***
 0.0594
***
 0.0128 
 (0.0122) (0.0144) (0.0680) 
Union membership -0.0272
**
 -0.0341
**
 -0.0102 
 (0.0138) (0.0166) (0.0499) 
Less than high school 0.2997
**
 0.4620
***
 0.4449 
 (0.0953) (0.1164) (0.7740) 
High school 0.4537
***
 0.6380
***
 0.4707 
 (0.0955) (0.1166) (0.7740) 
Less than college degree 0.5140
***
 0.6894
***
 0.5879 
 (0.0958) (0.1168) (0.7742) 
College degree 0.5824
***
 0.7959
***
 0.6041 
 (0.0969) (0.1180) (0.7775) 
Graduate degree 0.4982
***
 0.7183
***
 0.4603 
 (0.0999) (0.1208) (0.7830) 
Households size 0.2510
***
 0.2450
***
 0.3043
***
 
 (0.0052) (0.0058) (0.0195) 
Number of Children -0.2440
***
 -0.2496
***
 -0.3064
***
 
 (0.0067) (0.0077) (0.0261) 
Female 0.0519
***
 0.0732
***
 0.0969
**
 
 (0.0107) (0.0124) (0.0442) 
Age 0.0270
***
 0.0269
***
 0.0324
***
 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0022) 
Citizenship status -0.3721
***
 -0.4015
***
 -0.4074
***
 
 (0.0180) (0.0221) (0.0781) 
Black -0.5256
***
 -0.4928
***
 -0.6186
***
 
 (0.0145) (0.0163) (0.0559) 
Hispanic origin -0.3964
***
 -0.3580
***
 -0.4318
***
 
 (0.0152) (0.0175) (0.0588) 
Number of observation 98380 70566 8239 
Log-likelihood -91851994 -67888807 -6478426 
Chi-square 13443 9743 1244 
Notes:   
1. Each column includes 4 marriage dummies, 8 regional dummies and 23 year dummies. 
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 6 
Control Function Parameter Estimates for the Weibull Model 
Dependent Variable: Unemployment Duration 
Distributions No Heterogeneity Gamma Inverse-Gaussian 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Homeownership -0.0998
***
 -0.1489
***
 -0.1671
***
 
 (0.0103) (0.0135) (0.0163) 
Income 0.2991
***
 0.4459
***
 0.5008
***
 
 (0.0147) (0.0191) (0.0230) 
Unemployment benefit -0.4122
***
 -0.7669
***
 -0.8367
***
 
 (0.0096) (0.0176) (0.0158) 
Union 0.0485
***
 0.0680
***
 0.0819
***
 
 (0.0131) (0.0161) (0.0200) 
Less than high school 0.0461 0.0951 0.0771 
 (0.0788) (0.1151) (0.1257) 
High school 0.0169 0.0649 0.0353 
 (0.0802) (0.1167) (0.1278) 
Less than college degree 0.0935 0.1791 0.1706 
 (0.0809) (0.1173) (0.1288) 
College degree 0.0581 0.1203 0.1043 
 (0.0820) (0.1187) (0.1306) 
Graduate degree -0.0078 -0.0133 -0.0301 
 (0.0829) (0.1200) (0.1322) 
Households size -0.0081 0.0088 -0.0023 
 (0.0090) (0.0116) (0.0140) 
Number of Children -0.0061 -0.0209
*
 -0.0180 
 (0.0097) (0.0125) (0.0151) 
Female -0.1586
***
 -0.2315
***
 -0.2784
***
 
 (0.0097) (0.0126) (0.0153) 
Age -0.0107
***
 -0.0117
***
 -0.0162
***
 
 (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0016) 
Citizenship status 0.1527
***
 0.2105
***
 0.2408
***
 
 (0.0219) (0.0285) (0.0341) 
Black -0.3144
***
 -0.4747
***
 -0.5375
***
 
 (0.0228) (0.0297) (0.0358) 
Hispanic origin -0.2033
***
 -0.2942
***
 -0.3284
***
 
 (0.0196) (0.0258) (0.0308) 
IMR 0.4726
***
 0.7775
***
 0.8295
***
 
 (0.0594) (0.0771) (0.0925) 
Number of observations 98380 98380 98380 
Auxiliary Parameter ( )  1.048566899 1.362636242 1.715879543 
Log-likelihood -224258984.6 -221507893.7 -220131102.1 
Chi-square 14099.4646 10400.72449 14204.23781 
Notes:  
1. Each column includes 4 marriage dummies, 8 regional dummies and 23 year dummies. 
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 7 
Full-time Re-employment 
Parameter Estimates from Three Parametric Models, 1990-2013 
Dependent Variable: Unemployment Duration 
Model Exponential Weibull Cox PH 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Homeownership -0.125
***
 -0.129
***
 -0.121
***
 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Income 0.177
***
 0.190
***
 0.170
***
 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Unemployment benefit -0.372
***
 -0.377
***
 -0.353
***
 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Union membership 0.044
***
 0.050
***
 0.042
***
 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) 
Less than high school -0.081 -0.089 -0.075 
 (0.076) (0.081) (0.075) 
High school -0.116 -0.130 -0.105 
 (0.077) (0.081) (0.076) 
Less than college degree -0.136
*
 -0.150
*
 -0.124 
 (0.077) (0.081) (0.076) 
College degree -0.094 -0.114 -0.075 
 (0.078) (0.082) (0.077) 
Graduate degree -0.144
*
 -0.166
**
 -0.126 
 (0.079) (0.084) (0.078) 
Households size -0.079
***
 -0.085
***
 -0.077
***
 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Number of Children 0.068
***
 0.073
***
 0.065
***
 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Female -0.074
***
 -0.078
***
 -0.073
***
 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Age -0.014
***
 -0.015
***
 -0.014
***
 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Citizenship status 0.326
***
 0.338
***
 0.322
***
 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) 
Black -0.096
***
 -0.109
***
 -0.091
***
 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Hispanic origin -0.051
***
 -0.057
***
 -0.052
***
 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) 
Number of observation 98380 98380 98380 
Auxiliary Parameter - 1.0696 - 
Log-likelihood -205799918.6 -205270258.1 -2149381447 
Chi-square 13994 11641 11031 
Notes:  
1. Each column includes 4 marriage dummies, 8 regional dummies and 23 year dummies. 
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 8 
Full-time Re-employment 
Heterogeneity Parameter Estimates from the Weibull Model 
Dependent Variable: Unemployment Duration 
Distribution No Heterogeneity Gamma Inverse-Gaussian 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Homeownership -0.1293
***
 -0.1874
***
 -0.2198
***
 
 (0.0108) (0.0142) (0.0174) 
Income 0.1903
***
 0.2625
***
 0.3102
***
 
 (0.0056) (0.0075) (0.0093) 
Unemployment benefit -0.3772
***
 -0.7116
***
 -0.7790
***
 
 (0.0099) (0.0184) (0.0166) 
Union membership 0.0496
***
 0.0684
***
 0.0796
***
 
 (0.0137) (0.0169) (0.0214) 
Less than high school -0.0889 -0.1108 -0.1496 
 (0.0811) (0.1154) (0.1299) 
High school -0.1304 -0.1599 -0.2094 
 (0.0813) (0.1158) (0.1303) 
Less than college degree -0.1504
*
 -0.1814 -0.2392
*
 
 (0.0815) (0.1160) (0.1307) 
College degree -0.1142 -0.1399 -0.1821 
 (0.0824) (0.1171) (0.1322) 
Graduate degree -0.1665
**
 -0.2522
**
 -0.2961
**
 
 (0.0843) (0.1195) (0.1354) 
Households size -0.0851
***
 -0.1138
***
 -0.1376
***
 
 (0.0042) (0.0054) (0.0067) 
Number of Children 0.0730
***
 0.1031
***
 0.1195
***
 
 (0.0058) (0.0076) (0.0093) 
Female -0.0783
***
 -0.1174
***
 -0.1390
***
 
 (0.0100) (0.0129) (0.0160) 
Age -0.0151
***
 -0.0196
***
 -0.0244
***
 
 (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Citizenship status 0.3381
***
 0.5246
***
 0.5985
***
 
 (0.0185) (0.0247) (0.0294) 
Black -0.1094
***
 -0.1495
***
 -0.1789
***
 
 (0.0130) (0.0172) (0.0212) 
Hispanic origin -0.0569
***
 -0.0641
***
 -0.0793
***
 
 (0.0147) (0.0189) (0.0234) 
Number of observations 98380 98380 98380 
Auxiliary Parameter 1.0728 1.3687 1.7694 
Log-likelihood -205270258 -203185544 -201904437 
Chi-square 11641 8433 11677 
Notes:  
1. Each column includes 4 marriage dummies, 8 regional dummies and 23 year dummies. 
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 9 
Full-time Re-employment 
Control Function Parameter Estimates for the Weibull Model 
Dependent Variable: Unemployment Duration 
Distribution No Heterogeneity Gamma Inverse-Gaussian 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
Homeownership -0.1288
***
 -0.1865
***
 -0.2189
***
 
 (0.0108) (0.0142) (0.0174) 
Income 0.2792
***
 0.4132
***
 0.4666
***
 
 (0.0154) (0.0201) (0.0247) 
Unemployment benefit -0.3589
***
 -0.6832
***
 -0.7474
***
 
 (0.0102) (0.0185) (0.0171) 
Union membership 0.0439
**
 0.0582
***
 0.0694
**
 
 (0.0137) (0.0169) (0.0215) 
Less than high school 0.0038 0.0351 0.0087 
 (0.0831) (0.1176) (0.1327) 
High school 0.0023 0.0514 0.0186 
 (0.0846) (0.1193) (0.1351) 
Less than college degree -0.0063 0.0493 0.0085 
 (0.0853) (0.1201) (0.1362) 
College degree 0.0383 0.1044 0.0798 
 (0.0865) (0.1216) (0.1382) 
Graduate degree -0.0336 -0.0440 -0.0697 
 (0.0874) (0.1228) (0.1398) 
Households size -0.0300
**
 -0.0227
*
 -0.0420
**
 
 (0.0096) (0.0124) (0.0152) 
Number of Children 0.0186
*
 0.0133 0.0252 
 (0.0103) (0.0134) (0.0164) 
Female -0.0620
***
 -0.0909
***
 -0.1109
***
 
 (0.0103) (0.0133) (0.0165) 
Age -0.0092
***
 -0.0098
***
 -0.0141
***
 
 (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0017) 
Citizenship status 0.2476
***
 0.3731
***
 0.4402
***
 
 (0.0237) (0.0312) (0.0377) 
Black -0.2360
***
 -0.3604
***
 -0.3992
***
 
 (0.0241) (0.0314) (0.0385) 
Hispanic origin -0.1538
***
 -0.2246
***
 -0.2474
***
 
 (0.0208) (0.0273) (0.0333) 
IMR 0.3924
***
 0.6567
***
 0.6846
***
 
 (0.0627) (0.0818) (0.0998) 
Number of Observation 98380 98380 98380 
Auxiliary Parameter 1.0733 1.3710 1.7690 
Log-likelihood -205215036 -203103510 -201846316 
Chi-square 11654 8426 11681 
Notes:  
1. Each column includes 4 marriage dummies, 8 regional dummies and 23 year dummies. 
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 10 
Part-time Re-employment 
Parameter Estimates from Three Parametric Models, 1990-2013 
Dependent Variable: Unemployment Duration 
Model Exponential Weibull Cox PH 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Homeownership 0.197
***
 0.203
***
 0.214
***
 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) 
Income 0.246
***
 0.223
***
 0.189
***
 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Unemployment benefit -1.400
***
 -1.379
***
 -1.338
***
 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) 
Union membership 0.050 0.046 0.041 
 (0.039) (0.037) (0.035) 
Less than high school 0.896
**
 0.914
**
 0.934
**
 
 (0.374) (0.371) (0.369) 
High school 0.528 0.553 0.584 
 (0.375) (0.372) (0.369) 
Less than college degree 1.251
***
 1.272
***
 1.299
***
 
 (0.374) (0.372) (0.369) 
College degree 0.534 0.563 0.599 
 (0.378) (0.375) (0.372) 
Graduate degree 0.652
*
 0.687
*
 0.734
*
 
 (0.383) (0.380) (0.377) 
Households size -0.027
**
 -0.017
*
 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Number of Children 0.015 0.007 -0.005 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Female -1.018
***
 -1.006
***
 -0.991
***
 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) 
Age -0.045
***
 -0.043
***
 -0.040
***
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Citizenship status 0.359
***
 0.325
***
 0.280
***
 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) 
Black -0.649
***
 -0.621
***
 -0.586
***
 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) 
Hispanic origin -0.593
***
 -0.579
***
 -0.564
***
 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.042) 
Number of Observations 98380 98380 98380 
Auxiliary Parameter ( )  - 0.8799 - 
Log-likelihood -51672006 -51460408 -235508453 
Chi-square 6065 5854 5975 
Notes:  
1. Each column includes 4 marriage dummies, 8 regional dummies and 23 year dummies. 
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 11 
Part-time Re-employment 
Parameter Estimates for the Weibull Model, 1990-2013 
Dependent Variable: Unemployment Duration 
Distribution No Heterogeneity Gamma Inverse-Gaussian 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Homeownership 0.2030
***
 0.2403
***
 0.3105
***
 
 (0.0301) (0.0396) (0.0467) 
Income 0.2228
***
 0.2694
***
 0.3212
***
 
 (0.0174) (0.0225) (0.0265) 
Unemployment benefit -1.3787
***
 -1.7529
***
 -2.0884
***
 
 (0.0474) (0.0680) (0.0714) 
Union 0.0462 0.1067
**
 0.0974
*
 
 (0.0366) (0.0460) (0.0543) 
Less than high school 0.9139
**
 1.1289
**
 1.3804
**
 
 (0.3713) (0.4145) (0.4968) 
High school 0.5528 0.6814 0.8372
*
 
 (0.3721) (0.4152) (0.4980) 
Less than college degree 1.2717
***
 1.5725
***
 1.9247
***
 
 (0.3717) (0.4153) (0.4982) 
College degree 0.5627 0.7171
*
 0.8760
*
 
 (0.3747) (0.4198) (0.5026) 
Graduate degree 0.6869
*
 0.8608
**
 1.0618
**
 
 (0.3796) (0.4274) (0.5113) 
Households size -0.0170
*
 -0.0063 -0.0078 
 (0.0098) (0.0131) (0.0150) 
Number of Children 0.0067 -0.0078 -0.0195 
 (0.0163) (0.0214) (0.0246) 
Female -1.0064
***
 -1.3718
***
 -1.6247
***
 
 (0.0282) (0.0485) (0.0461) 
Age -0.0430
***
 -0.0480
***
 -0.0574
***
 
 (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0027) 
Citizenship status 0.3251
***
 0.3656
***
 0.4581
***
 
 (0.0430) (0.0567) (0.0663) 
Black -0.6214
***
 -0.7781
***
 -0.9353
***
 
 (0.0404) (0.0542) (0.0628) 
Hispanic origin -0.5788
***
 -0.7106
***
 -0.8610
***
 
 (0.0436) (0.0568) (0.0670) 
Number of Observations 98380 98380 98380 
Auxiliary Parameter 0.8772 1.1221 1.3603 
Log-likelihood -51460408 -51146020 -51020258 
Chi-square 5854 2845 3083 
Notes:  
1. Each column includes 4 marriage dummies, 8 regional dummies, and 23 year dummies. 
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 12  
Part-time Re-employment 
Control Function Estimates of the Weibull Model, 1990-2013 
Dependent Variables: Unemployment Duration 
Distribution No Heterogeneity Gamma Inverse-Gaussian 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Homeownership 0.2128
***
 0.2531
***
 0.3228
***
 
 (0.0305) (0.0405) (0.0471) 
Income 0.4128
***
 0.6002
***
 0.6724
***
 
 (0.0464) (0.0579) (0.0645) 
Unemployment benefit -1.3421
***
 -1.7040
***
 -2.0119
***
 
 (0.0482) (0.0682) (0.0714) 
Union membership 0.0364 0.0866
*
 0.0761 
 (0.0367) (0.0463) (0.0541) 
Less than high school 1.1280
**
 1.4881
***
 1.7436
***
 
 (0.3760) (0.4280) (0.5019) 
High school 0.8517
**
 1.1812
**
 1.3567
**
 
 (0.3800) (0.4328) (0.5073) 
Less than college degree 1.5920
***
 2.1149
***
 2.4795
***
 
 (0.3809) (0.4348) (0.5092) 
College degree 0.9032
**
 1.2886
**
 1.4706
**
 
 (0.3845) (0.4401) (0.5141) 
Graduate degree 0.9857
**
 1.3579
**
 1.5751
**
 
 (0.3875) (0.4449) (0.5203) 
Households size 0.0950
***
 0.1898
***
 0.2000
***
 
 (0.0280) (0.0337) (0.0371) 
Number of Children -0.1054
***
 -0.2035
***
 -0.2269
***
 
 (0.0307) (0.0379) (0.0421) 
Female -0.9733
***
 -1.3265
***
 -1.5571
***
 
 (0.0289) (0.0482) (0.0466) 
Age -0.0309
***
 -0.0272
***
 -0.0349
***
 
 (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0045) 
Citizenship status 0.1353
**
 0.0407 0.1086 
 (0.0619) (0.0791) (0.0891) 
Black -0.8939
***
 -1.2456
***
 -1.4295
***
 
 (0.0757) (0.0951) (0.1063) 
Hispanic origin -0.7881
***
 -1.0681
***
 -1.2381
***
 
 (0.0652) (0.0829) (0.0938) 
IMR 0.8416
***
 1.4340
***
 1.5413
***
 
 (0.1909) (0.2347) (0.2604) 
Number of Observation 98380 98380 98380 
Auxiliary Parameter 0.8777 1.1311 1.3553 
Log-likelihood -51430467 -51099843 -50978750 
Chi-square 5741 2805 3100 
Notes:  
1. Each column includes 4 marriage dummies, 8 regional dummies, and 23 year dummies. 
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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CHAPTER III: 
JOB SEARCH INTENSITY AND HOMEOWNERSHIP: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
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INTRODUCTION 
Homeownership affects how intensively an unemployed individual searches for a job. 
However, theoretical prediction of this relationship is ambiguous. Home equity eases the search 
process by providing wealth that renters may not possess. On the contrary, because 
homeownership requires mortgage obligations, unemployed homeowners search for job more 
intensively and return to work more quickly to avoid default (Goss and Phillips, 2007; 
Rouwendal and Nijkamp, 2007; Flatau et al., 2003). Theoretically, this means the relationship 
between search intensity and homeownership could either be negative or positive.  
This paper investigates empirically the relationship between job search intensity and 
homeownership. Few studies have investigated the relationship between job search intensity and 
homeownership (Arzilli and Morescalchi, 2010), even though a large literature exists studying 
the relationship between job search intensity and variables such as unemployment spell (Krueger 
and Mueller, 2011; Fallick and Ryu, 2007; Bloemen, 2005; Pissarides, 1982) and unemployment 
benefit (Krueger and Mueller, 2010; Burgess and Low, 1998).  My paper contributes to the 
literature by being the first study to use the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) data to study 
how homeownership affects job search intensity. 
I use the ATUS data from 2003 to 2013. For the full sample, I find that unemployed 
homeowners search for job less intensively than unemployed renters. However, when the sample 
is disaggregated into different types of unemployed groups, job losers and temporary layoff 
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homeowners search for jobs more intensively than renters, while homeowners who are re-entrant 
and job leavers search for job less intensively than renters.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the data and descriptive 
statistics; section 3 presents the methodology; section 4 presents the estimation results; and 
section 5 concludes. 
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DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
I use the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) data for this study.
8
 The ATUS data 
collection began in 2003.  Each ATUS respondent provides detailed information about activities 
during a designated 24-hour period, called a diary day.  
The individuals chosen for participation in the ATUS are selected randomly from 
households that have completed their participation in the Current Population Survey (CPS). In 
the household selected to participate in the ATUS, one randomly-selected person aged 15 or 
older in the household is asked to complete a one-day time diary.  
In extracting the data set from the ATUS-X database, I remove individuals below 18 
years and above 65 years. Individuals who are not in the labor force are also removed.  The 
remaining individuals in the data set consist of individuals who are  i  unemployed workers, 
 ii  between 18 years and 65 years, and  iii work for wages.   
Search intensity is measured as the total time allocated by an unemployed individual on 
job search activities during a diary day. It is computed from the ATUS-X database based on the 
time allocated to the following activities presented in Table 1. This measurement of search 
intensity follows Krueger and Mueller (2010). However, there are other measures of search 
intensity which include the number of search methods used (Masagué, 2008; Salas-Velasco, 
2007) and the number of job applications made in a reference period (Gautier et al., 2007).   
 
                                                 
8
 See detailed information about the ATUS in Horrigan and Herz (2004) 
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Table 1 
Job Search Related Activities  
Search Activities Job Interview 
Asking about job openings Interviewing by phone or in person 
Asking former employers to provide references Preparing for interview 
Auditioning for acting role (non-volunteer) Scheduling/canceling interview (for self) 
Auditioning for band/symphony (non-
volunteer) 
Waiting associated with job search or 
interview 
Checking vacancies Waiting to go in for an interview 
Contacting employer Security procedures associated with job 
search and interview 
Filling out job application Being searched at security checkpoint (job 
search) 
Making phone calls to prospective employer Opening bags for security search (job 
search) 
Meeting with headhunter/temporary agency Passing through metal detector (job search) 
Picking up job application  
Placing/answering ads  
Reading ads in paper/on internet  
Researching an employer  
Researching details about a job  
Sending out resumes  
Sending resumes to employers  
Submitting applications  
Writing/updating resume  
 
Tables 2 and 3 report the summary statistics of the ATUS variables used for estimation. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics when the sample is disaggregated into homeowners and 
renters.  The Table shows that homeowners constitute 56.84%  of the entire sample. On average, 
job search intensity for homeowners and renters are 31.23  and 34.43  minutes, respectively. This 
means that renters, on average, renters allocate more time for job search activities. Similarly, 
when the sample is disaggregated into different types of unemployed groups, i.e. job losers, 
temporary layoffs, re-entrants and job leavers, as in Krueger and Mueller (2010), the same trend 
exists. 
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In Krueger and Mueller (2010), job losers are defined as individuals on layoff in the CPS, 
individuals who report in the CPS that their temporary job has ended and individuals who are 
employed at the time of the CPS interview (and subsequently became unemployed). Individuals who 
are unemployed on temporary layoff with an expectation of recall are defined as those who indicate 
(in the ATUS interview) that they were given a date to return to work or that they expect to be 
recalled to their previous employer within the next 6 months. Re-entrants are defined as those 
unemployed who indicate that they were re-entrants in the CPS. Those who are classified as out of 
the labor force in the CPS but as unemployed in the ATUS are also included in this category. 
Voluntary job leavers are defined as those who indicate that they quit their job. They note that 
individuals in these groups may behave differently in the labor market. 
Table 3 shows that homeowners have spouses with higher wages compared to spouses of 
renters. There are more homeowners who belong to unions than renters. Also, more homeowners 
receive unemployment benefits. On average, homeowners also tend to be older, and have larger 
family sizes and more dependent children than renters. Table 2 reveals that homeowners spend 
more years on education and are more likely to be married than renters. Blacks and Hispanics are 
more likely to be renters than homeowners. 
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METHODOLOGY 
The unit of search intensity is minutes. This means that it has a zero and 1440 minutes 
lower and upper limits on a diary day. Hence, I estimate a two-limit Tobit model of the following 
form for job search intensity on the ATUS data described in the previous section from 2003 to 
2013: 
                                        * 2, | , ~ 0,s H X u u H X N                                                1  
*
* *
*
0 0
0 1440
1440 1440
if s
s s if s
if s
 

  


 
where the variable s  denotes search intensity,  measured by the total time allocated to job search 
activities in minutes per diary day. The variable H is homeownership status, which equals 1 if an 
individual is a homeowner and 0  if an individual is a renter.  The variable X is a vector of 
control variables including spouse income, union membership, unemployment benefit, age, 
family size, dependent children defined as children under 18 years of age in the household, 
education, gender, marital status, Black, Hispanics, citizenship, state dummies, and year 
dummies.  
The two-limit Tobit model is estimated using a maximum likelihood approach with a log-
likelihood function for a random draw for an individual i  as: 
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      
    
      
ln | , ; 1 0 ln 0
1 1440 ln 1440
1 0 1440 ln 1
i i i i i i
i i i
i i i i
f y H X y H X
y H X
y y H X
   
  
   
      
       
       
                2  
The log-likelihood for a random sample n  is obtained by summing equation  2  across all .i  
The average partial effect (APE) of a continuous variable jX  is obtained by averaging the 
derivative of  | ,E y H X  i.e. 
                  
 
     
| ,
1440 0i i i i i
i
E y H X
H X H X
X
      

        
               3  
For comparison purposes, I also estimate OLS model. In order to compare the average 
partial effects of the Tobit model with the OLS estimates, equation   3  is evaluated at the mean 
of each variable. For a binary variable, the APEs are obtained from equation  3  by taking the 
difference of two expected values at the two categories of the binary variables and then 
averaging the differences (Wooldridge, 2010). The standard errors of the APEs are computed 
using the delta method. Elasticities of y  with respect to the explanatory variables, conditional on
0 1440y  , are also computed from the Tobit model as: 
 
 
| 0 1440, ,
| 0 1440, ,
i i i
i
i i i
E y y H X X
X E y y H X

  
 
  
                             5  
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REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 4 presents the results from the two-limit Tobit model. The coefficient on 
homeownership is negative and statistically significant in all the columns. Table 5 reports the 
corresponding APEs of the coefficients in Table 4. The coefficient on homeownership, which 
measures the average difference in minutes of search intensity between a homeowner and a 
renter who has the same level of values for all the other explanatory variables, is negative and 
statistically significant in all the specifications. In column (1), homeowners search for job 1.97 
minutes less than renters on average during a day.  When some control variables are added in 
column (2), the coefficient on homeownership shows that a homeowner searches for a job on 
average 16.52 minutes less than a renter during a day. In column (3), where additional controls 
are added to the model, on average, the difference in time allocated for a job search between the 
homeowner and renter is approximately the same. When state and year controls are added, the 
difference in search time decreases to 13.22 minutes. 
Table 6 reports the OLS estimates. In column (1), where only homeownership is included 
in the regression equation, the coefficient on homeownership means that, on average, the 
homeowner searches for job 1.84 minutes less than the renter. In column (2), where spouse 
income, union membership, unemployment benefit, and age are included in the regression 
equation, if we take a homeowner and a renter with the same level of spouse income, union 
membership, unemployment benefit, and age, on average, the homeowner searches for a job 
25.73 minutes less than the renter. In column (3), where additional controls are added, the 
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coefficient on homeownership remains negative and statistically significant. In column (4), 
where I add state and year dummies, the coefficient on homeownership increase from -25.62 
minutes to -27.19 minutes. 
Table 7 compares the full sample estimates of the two-limit Tobit and OLS. From the 
Table, it can be seen that the OLS overestimated the difference in the search time between 
homeowners and renters. Table 7 also presents the elasticities of search intensity with respect to 
each explanatory variable. The elasticity of search intensity with respect to homeownership is 
reported to be -0.58.  
From the above results, there is evidence that job search intensity for homeowners is less 
than that for renters, contrary to Arzilli and Morescalchi (2010). One explanation for this result is 
that homeowners are, on average, more liquid than renters. Consequently, homeowners search 
less intensively since they are less financially constrained to return quickly to work.  
Krueger and Mueller (2010) note that disaggregating the unemployed into different 
groups can have significant impact on the regression results discussed above since individuals 
who belong to each group may behave differently during their job searches in the labor market. 
Hence, to check whether the previous estimation results are robust, I divided the sample into four 
different sub-samples based on the definitions of job losers, temporary layoffs, re-entrants and 
voluntary job leavers. 
The estimates of the two-limit Tobit model for the sub-samples are in Table 9 with their 
corresponding APEs in Table 10. The full-sample results are shown in column (1). The full 
sample only indicates whether an individual is unemployed without indicating the type of 
unemployed group. The Tobit estimate on homeownership shows that homeowners search 11.59 
minutes less than renters in column (1).  Job losers search 25 minutes more than renters. 
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Temporary unemployed homeowners also search 41.74 minutes more than renters. In column 
(4), homeowners who are re-entrants search for 0.52 minutes less than renters. Column (5) shows 
job leavers search 26.74 minutes less than renters.  
Table 10 reports the OLS estimates based on the different sub-samples. The coefficient 
on homeownership in column (1) is negative and statistically significant. It shows that, on 
average, homeowners search for job 18.12 minutes less than the renters. In column (2), a 
homeowner who is a job loser searches 24.79 minutes more than a renter who is a job loser. In 
column (3), a homeowner who is on temporary layoff and expecting a recall searches on average, 
119.76 minutes more than a renter. In column (4), a homeowner who is a re-entrant searches 
39.56 minutes less than a renter. Similarly, a homeowner who is a job leaver searches on 
average, 84.18 minutes less than a renter, as reported in column (5). 
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CONCLUSION 
This study investigates the relationship between search intensity and homeownership 
using the ATUS data from 2003 to 2013. Both two-limit Tobit models and linear regression 
model are estimated. The justification for the two-limit Tobit model is that the dependent 
variable job search intensity is a censored variable a 0 lower limit and 1440 upper limit. 
I find from different specifications of these two models that when I do not disaggregate 
the sample into various unemployed groups, homeowners search less intensively for jobs than 
renters. This result may be as a result of home equity which eases the search process for 
homeowners so that they do not have to intensively look for jobs to quickly return to work unlike 
renters. 
However, when I disaggregate the sample into various unemployed groups, job losers and 
temporary lay-off homeowners search more for jobs than renters, while homeowners who are re-
entrant and job leavers search less for jobs than renters. A job loser may want to return to work 
quickly to fulfill mortgage obligations and this will serve as an incentive to intensively look for 
job. Temporary lay-off homeowners may not be prepared financially for layoffs are more likely 
to anticipate becoming unemployed and so plan ahead. 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Search Intensity (Minutes) 32.62 93.72 0 1350 
Homeownership (=1) 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Spouse Income ($) 836.03 603.07 1 2884.61 
Union Membership (=1) 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Unemployment Benefit (=1) 0.83 0.38 0 1 
Age (Years) 38.01 13.20 18 65 
Family Size 3.16 1.61 1 13 
Dependent Children (=1) 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Education (Years) 12.87 2.87 0 19 
Female (=1) 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Married (=1) 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Citizenship (=1) 0.89 0.31 0 1 
Blacks (=1) 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Hispanics (=1) 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Observations                                                       683150 
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Table 3 
Means and Percentages of Variables by Homeownership Status 
Variables Homeowner Renter Full Sample 
Search Intensity (Minutes) 31.23 34.43 32.62 
(i) Job Loser 132.80 141.62 136.13 
(ii) Temporary Layoff  113.76 122.35 117.71 
(iii) Re-entrants 107.10 110.35 108.67 
(iv) Leavers 141.51 173.6 157.12 
Homeownership (%) 56.84 43.16 - 
Spouse Income ($) 942.50 614.30 836.03 
Union Membership (%) 15.36 8.08 12.36 
Unemployment Benefit (%) 83.35 81.48 82.56 
Age (Years) 40.25 35.06 38.01 
Family Size  3.28 2.99 3.16 
Dependent Children (%) 45.49 42.08 44.02 
Education (Years) 13.28 12.32 12.87 
Female (%) 51.69 61.24 55.81 
Married (%) 48.37 27.67 39.44 
Citizenship (%) 92.68 84.39 89.10 
Blacks (%) 16.39 30.87 22.64 
Hispanics (%) 15.32 23.58 18.88 
Notes: 
1. Means are reported for continuous variables. 
2. Percentages are reported for binary variables. 
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Table 4 
Two-limit Tobit Regression for ATUS Data (Full Sample), 2003-2013 
Dependent Variable: Search Intensity (Minutes) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Homeownership -9.7067
***
 -81.3713
***
 -85.7570
***
 -111.2910
***
 
 (0.1011) (0.4088) (0.4433) (0.4153) 
Spouse Income  0.0498
***
 0.0082
***
 -0.0031
***
 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Union Membership  -131.3724
***
 -152.3879
***
 -153.9954
***
 
  (0.5483) (0.5264) (0.4808) 
Unemployment Benefit  171.5374
***
 144.7049
***
 182.5733
***
 
  (0.4995) (0.4863) (0.4776) 
Age  15.2794
***
 26.2973
***
 15.9625
***
 
  (0.1126) (0.1182) (0.1116) 
Age-Square  -0.1628
***
 -0.2911
***
 -0.1643
***
 
  (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) 
Family Size   -48.7660
***
 -44.4118
***
 
   (0.2016) (0.1885) 
Dependent Child   73.1061
***
 83.6221
***
 
   (0.4761) (0.4685) 
Education   26.0369
***
 31.6770
***
 
   (0.0616) (0.0613) 
Female   -85.6215
***
 -88.0876
***
 
   (0.3258) (0.3253) 
Married   -67.0476
***
 -42.1500
***
 
   (0.5870) (0.6126) 
Citizenship   67.9395
***
 81.1099
***
 
   (0.7433) (0.6430) 
Black   -8.2040
***
 18.6718
***
 
   (0.5510) (0.5695) 
Hispanics   53.8189
***
 55.1388
***
 
   (0.6283) (0.6000) 
Observations 683150 77789 77789 77789 
F-Statistic 9219 45635 48689 38734 
Pseudo R-Square 0.0040 0.0100 0.0255 0.0541 
Log-likelihood -116833031.9 -12729338.34 -12530506.47 -12163260.06 
Notes: 
1. 49 state and 10 year dummies are omitted from column (4). 
2. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 5 
 Average Partial Effects: Tobit Regression (Full Sample), 2003-2013 
Dependent Variable: Search Intensity (Minutes) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Homeownership -1.9659
***
 -16.5236
***
 -16.1653
***
 -13.2219
***
 
 (0.0205) (0.0835) (0.0840) (0.0517) 
Spouse Income  0.0101
***
 0.0015
***
 -0.0004
***
 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Union Membership  -26.6771
***
 -28.7252
***
 -18.2954
***
 
  (0.1099) (0.0986) (0.0588) 
Unemployment Benefit  34.8332
***
 27.2770
***
 21.6906
***
 
  (0.1002) (0.0914) (0.0585) 
Age  3.1027
***
 4.9571
***
 1.8964
***
 
  (0.0230) (0.0225) (0.0135) 
Age-Square  -0.0331
***
 -0.0549
***
 -0.0195
***
 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Family Size   -9.1924
***
 -5.2764
***
 
   (0.0374) (0.0226) 
Dependent Child   13.7806
***
 9.9347
***
 
   (0.0891) (0.0564) 
Education   4.9080
**
 3.7634
***
 
   (0.0115) (0.0077) 
Female   -16.1397
***
 -10.4653
***
 
   (0.0622) (0.0399) 
Married   -12.6385
***
 -5.0076
***
 
   (0.1110) (0.0733) 
Citizenship   12.8067
***
 9.6363
***
 
   (0.1402) (0.0776) 
Black   -1.5465
***
 2.2183
***
 
   (0.1039) (0.0676) 
Hispanics   10.1449
***
 6.5508
***
 
   (0.1189) (0.0719) 
Observations 683150 77789 77789 77789 
Notes: 
1. 49 state and 10 year dummies are omitted from column (4). 
2. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 6 
OLS Regression for ATUS Data (Full Sample), 2003-2013 
Dependent Variable: Search Intensity (Minutes) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Homeownership -1.8422
***
 -25.7348
***
 -25.6235
***
 -27.1944
***
 
 (0.0241) (0.1096) (0.1162) (0.1043) 
Spouse Income  0.0106
***
 0.0042
***
 -0.0002
**
 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Union Membership  -16.9084
***
 -23.7819
***
 -26.4088
***
 
  (0.1049) (0.1087) (0.1106) 
Unemployment Benefit  29.6240
***
 21.2988
***
 27.4007
***
 
  (0.0751) (0.0760) (0.0701) 
Age  2.7784
***
 5.6472
***
 4.0325
***
 
  (0.0244) (0.0261) (0.0256) 
Age-Square  -0.0287
***
 -0.0608
***
 -0.0410
***
 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Family Size   -6.3852
***
 -6.2384
***
 
   (0.0353) (0.0397) 
Dependent Child   9.6351
***
 12.6633
***
 
   (0.1140) (0.1194) 
Education   4.9371
***
 6.0337
***
 
   (0.0141) (0.0150) 
Female   -22.8339
***
 -25.1710
***
 
   (0.0757) (0.0838) 
Married   -25.5170
***
 -28.2450
***
 
   (0.1863) (0.1913) 
Citizenship   6.3693
***
 6.4138
***
 
   (0.1614) (0.1555) 
Black   -3.3122
***
 0.7591
***
 
   (0.1408) (0.1513) 
Hispanics   13.9222
***
 9.0257
***
 
   (0.1472) (0.1542) 
Observation 683150 77789 77789 77789 
F-Statistic 5850.40 55417.99 39335.68 28645.12 
R-Square 0.00009161 0.02819 0.06889 0.1556 
Adjusted R-Square  0.00009156 0.02819 0.06889 0.1556 
Log-likelihood -396518790.9 -42584577.2 -42434443.08 -42091400.11 
Notes: 
1. 49 state and 10 year dummies are omitted from column (4). 
2. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
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Table 7 
 Average Partial Effects and Elasticity: OLS and Tobit 
Dependent Variable: Search Intensity (Minutes) 
 
Independent Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
OLS Tobit APE Tobit Elasticity 
Homeownership -27.1944
***
 -13.2219
***
 -0.5773
***
 
 (0.1043) (0.0517) (0.0022) 
Spouse Income -0.0002
**
 -0.0004
***
 -0.0184
***
 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0018) 
Union Membership -26.4088
***
 -18.2954
***
 -0.1766
***
 
 (0.1106) (0.0588) (0.0006) 
Unemployment Benefit 27.4007
***
 21.6906
***
 1.0656
***
 
 (0.0701) (0.0585) (0.0027) 
Age 4.0325
***
 1.8964
***
 4.8244
***
 
 (0.0256) (0.0135) (0.0338) 
Age-Square -0.0410
***
 -0.0195
***
 -2.2272
***
 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0176) 
Family Size -6.2384
***
 -5.2764
***
 -1.1183
***
 
 (0.0397) (0.0226) (0.0048) 
Dependent Child 12.6633
***
 9.9347
***
 0.3461
***
 
 (0.1194) (0.0564) (0.0019) 
Education 6.0337
***
 3.7634
***
 3.0262
***
 
 (0.0150) (0.0077) (0.0062) 
Female -25.1710
***
 -10.4653
***
 -0.3250
***
 
 (0.0838) (0.0399) (0.0012) 
Married -28.2450
***
 -5.0076
***
 -0.2631
***
 
 (0.1913) (0.0733) (0.0038) 
Citizenship 6.4138
***
 9.6363
***
 0.5159
***
 
 (0.1555) (0.0776) (0.0041) 
Black 0.7591
***
 2.2183
***
 0.0127
***
 
 (0.1513) (0.0676) (0.0004) 
Hispanics 9.0257
***
 6.5508
***
 0.0719
***
 
 (0.1542) (0.0719) (0.0008) 
Observations 77789 77789 77789 
Notes: 
1. 49 state and 10 year dummies are omitted from column (4). 
2. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 8 
Tobit Regression, 2003-2013 
Dependent Variable: Search Intensity (Minutes) 
 
Independent Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Full-Sample Losers Temporal Re-entrants Leavers 
Homeownership -67.5147
***
 80.3870
***
 220.3204
***
 -4.9392
***
 -106.5283
***
 
 (0.2684) (0.5563) (1.1178) (0.8691) (1.0387) 
Spouse Income 0.0166
***
 -0.0018
***
 0.0891
***
 0.0618
***
 0.0453
***
 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Unemployment Benefit 147.2473
***
 269.8508
***
 161.5661
***
 -54.3315
***
 -86.9989
***
 
 (0.3790) (0.8471) (2.3069) (0.8853) (1.5478) 
Age 25.0606
***
 -7.8743
***
 -86.4965
***
 20.2160
***
 260.2634
***
 
 (0.0730) (0.1370) (0.3581) (0.2611) (0.5424) 
Age-Square -0.2785
***
 0.0670
***
 0.9986
***
 -0.2423
***
 -3.0643
***
 
 (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0042) (0.0033) (0.0065) 
Family Size -46.3627
***
 -57.9703
***
 -67.8846
***
 -65.4504
***
 53.6403
***
 
 (0.1260) (0.2118) (0.3773) (0.3230) (0.6143) 
Dependent Child 55.5541
***
 119.9658
***
 15.2547
***
 398.8888
***
 -421.8438
***
 
 (0.2975) (0.5266) (1.4845) (1.0564) (1.6458) 
Education 25.3620
***
 13.0808
***
 -18.5621
***
 1.4630
***
 11.6441
***
 
 (0.0439) (0.0714) (0.2311) (0.1389) (0.2170) 
Female -104.4546
***
 -119.3336
***
 -123.6800
***
 -81.1307
***
 -194.8538
***
 
 (0.2244) (0.4039) (0.9105) (0.9068) (1.0276) 
Married -48.9596
***
 -101.0420
***
 289.9287
***
 -69.7663
***
 -117.6019
***
 
 (0.3159) (0.6001) (1.2265) (0.8972) (1.2989) 
Citizenship -24.1511
***
 -59.6211
***
 -33.9960
***
 99.3419
***
 -626.4607
***
 
 (0.4271) (0.7333) (1.7171) (1.1217) (2.0284) 
Black 3.9689
***
 38.7320
***
 227.8658
***
 -70.6360
***
 -470.5574
***
 
 (0.3411) (0.6510) (1.3249) (1.3049) (2.2996) 
Hispanics 27.1287
***
 63.0119
***
 -123.5987
***
 137.8178
***
 179.1932
***
 
 (0.3788) (0.6890) (1.3988) (1.3033) (1.4083) 
Observations 185976 81168 18055 25095 16661 
Log-likelihood -27854122 -25773437 -4367220 -5757752 -4536657 
Pseudo R-Square 0.0413 0.0279 0.0985 0.07007 0.1648 
Notes: 
1. 49 state and 10 year dummies are omitted from column (4). 
2. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 9 
 Average Partial Effects: Tobit Regression, 2003-2013 
Dependent Variable: Search Intensity (Minutes) 
 
Independent Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Full-Sample Losers Temporal Re-entrants Leavers 
Homeownership -11.5857
***
 25.4053
***
 41.7442
***
 -0.5224
***
 -26.7385
***
 
 (0.0467) (0.1755) (0.2250) (0.0922) (0.2751) 
Spouse Income 0.0029
***
 -0.0006
***
 0.0169
***
 0.0065
***
 0.0114
***
 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Unemployment Benefit 25.2680
***
 85.2830
***
 30.6120
***
 -5.7459
***
 -21.8366
***
 
 (0.0637) (0.2637) (0.4301) (0.0933) (0.3731) 
Age 4.3005
***
 -2.4886
***
 -16.3885
***
 2.1380
***
 65.3258
***
 
 (0.0125) (0.0434) (0.0878) (0.0271) (0.1455) 
Age-Square -0.0478
***
 0.0212
***
 0.1892
***
 -0.0256
***
 -0.7691
***
 
 (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0017) 
Family Size -7.9560
***
 -18.3208
***
 -12.8621
***
 -6.9218
***
 13.4637
***
 
 (0.0212) (0.0671) (0.0777) (0.0375) (0.1549) 
Dependent Child 9.5332
***
 37.9137
***
 2.8903
***
 42.1852
***
 -105.8822
***
 
 (0.0509) (0.1671) (0.2834) (0.1433) (0.4023) 
Education 4.3522
***
 4.1340
***
 -3.5170
***
 0.1547
***
 2.9226
***
 
 (0.0075) (0.0224) (0.0397) (0.0146) (0.0559) 
Female -17.9247
***
 -37.7139
***
 -23.4337
***
 -8.5801
***
 -48.9080
***
 
 (0.0398) (0.1288) (0.1773) (0.0978) (0.2725) 
Married -8.4016
***
 -31.9331
***
 54.9330
***
 -7.3783
***
 -29.5179
***
 
 (0.0544) (0.1901) (0.2738) (0.0929) (0.3201) 
Citizenship -4.1444
***
 -18.8425
***
 -6.4412
***
 10.5061
***
 -157.2408
***
 
 (0.0733) (0.2322) (0.3280) (0.1218) (0.6037) 
Black 0.6811
***
 12.2408
***
 43.1739
***
 -7.4702
***
 -118.1093
***
 
 (0.0585) (0.2057) (0.3075) (0.1383) (0.7194) 
Hispanics 4.6554
***
 19.9141
***
 -23.4183
***
 14.5752
***
 44.9773
***
 
 (0.0652) (0.2176) (0.2462) (0.1328) (0.3837) 
Observations 185976 81168 18055 25095 16661 
Notes: 
1. 49 state and 10 year dummies are omitted from column (4). 
2. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 10 
 OLS Regression, 2003-2013 
Dependent Variable: Search Intensity (Minutes) 
 
Independent Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Full-Sample Losers Temporary Re-entrants Leavers 
Homeownership -18.1225
***
 24.7866
***
 119.7573
***
 -39.5583
***
 -84.1842
***
 
 (0.0735) (0.2117) (0.5062) (0.3223) (0.5590) 
Spouse Income 0.0073
***
 0.0137
***
 0.0032
***
 0.0408
***
 0.0100
***
 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Unemployment Benefit 19.4389
***
 77.7912
***
 56.6125
***
 -15.6219
***
 -47.6729
***
 
 (0.0579) (0.2133) (0.8041) (0.3252) (0.9439) 
Age 4.1457
***
 -6.6134
***
 -50.6508
***
 9.8130
***
 59.5463
***
 
 (0.0186) (0.0563) (0.1667) (0.0983) (0.1609) 
Age-Square -0.0463
***
 0.0688
***
 0.5881
***
 -0.1243
***
 -0.6956
***
 
 (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0017) 
Family Size -6.5716
***
 -14.5772
***
 -34.9091
***
 -17.9702
***
 10.9664
***
 
 (0.0219) (0.0745) (0.1746) (0.0874) (0.3797) 
Dependent Child 6.0159
***
 32.9570
***
 28.0578
***
 112.8254
***
 -94.7584
***
 
 (0.0766) (0.2014) (0.6588) (0.3368) (0.9391) 
Education 4.8356
***
 1.2537
***
 -11.5995
***
 -2.5756
***
 1.0222
***
 
 (0.0107) (0.0291) (0.0788) (0.0506) (0.1069) 
Female -30.6867
***
 -45.0454
***
 -64.5272
***
 -38.6622
***
 0.9497
*
 
 (0.0603) (0.1591) (0.4193) (0.3504) (0.4894) 
Married -17.1968
***
 -41.9078
***
 119.8749
***
 -21.4540
***
 -75.0479
***
 
 (0.0942) (0.2685) (0.5267) (0.3513) (0.6432) 
Citizenship -15.9593
***
 -21.3930
***
 23.0097
***
 32.9433
***
 -203.9191
***
 
 (0.1354) (0.2909) (0.6757) (0.4062) (1.0410) 
Black -3.8389
***
 -0.2962 44.5694
***
 -10.6122
***
 -117.0842
***
 
 (0.0914) (0.2593) (0.5624) (0.4978) (1.4548) 
Hispanics 3.2522
***
 16.9227
***
 -74.0871
***
 50.3313
***
 164.7219
***
 
 (0.1035) (0.2674) (0.4349) (0.5002) (1.0917) 
Observation 185976 81168 18055 25095 16661 
Log-likelihood -90627519 -57186071 -8983129 -15035273 -8700752 
R-Square 0.1298 0.1332 0.5589 0.3039 0.7358 
Adjusted R-Square 0.1298 .0.1332 0.5589 0.3039 0.7358 
Notes: 
1. 49 state and 10 year dummies are omitted from column (4). 
2. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
3. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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